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INTRODUCTION
Home ownership in America comprises an elemental part of the
metaphorical American dream, conferring social status, financial security
and stronger community ties to its beneficiaries.1 These benefits have
been extended to a growing proportion of Americans in recent years,
including minority and lower-income persons who have traditionally
been excluded from access to the credit opportunities necessary to either
purchase homes or collateralize their home equity into valuable liquid
assets.2 Over the past decade, a wave of new mortgage products –
including loans to “subprime” borrowers – and a host of new providers –
including mortgage brokers, mortgage bankers and finance companies –
has simultaneously emerged to service this growing market sector.3
Some of those new providers, however, have become known for
their unscrupulous business practices. Known as “predatory lenders,”
they prey on vulnerable and financially unsophisticated persons, trapping
thousands into exploitative loans that are as equally profitable for lenders
as they are destructive for borrowers.4 Each year, predatory lending has
sucked many billions of dollars out of the home equity and from the
income of many Americans,5 and has resulted in a rash of devastating
residential home foreclosures throughout the nation. Notably, predatory
lending has also been found in high concentrations in New Jersey.6
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According to a recent study by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development, 40 percent of new homeowners since 1994 are minorities, even though
they account for just 24 percent of the U.S. population and that African American and
Hispanic homeownership rates have been growing at twice that of white homeowners.
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and
Research, Issue Brief No. 3 (December 2000); see also JOINT CENTER FOR HOUSING
STUDIES OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY, THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 15 (June 16,
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LENDING 2 (2001) (revised October 30, 2001) [hereinafter COST OF PREDATORY
LENDING] (estimating that several categories of abusive lending practices cost
American homeowners $9.1 billion annually).
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Federal mortgage regulations and state law fraud protections have not
sufficiently deterred predatory home lending practices in New Jersey.
Indeed, even defining a core concept of “predatory lending” has eluded
regulators7 and scholars8 because like, for example, the doctrine of
unconscionability, its manifestations are generally context-specific.9
New Jersey, by passing the Home Ownership Security Act in
2002 (“HOSA” or “the Act”),10 became one of a handful of leading
states to comprehensively respond to the problem of predatory lending
within its borders. 11 The New Jersey legislature did not choose to
specifically define “predatory lending” nor to simply leave a definition
of the prohibited practice sufficiently broad and ambiguous so that
common law courts could adjudicate its parameters on a case-by- case
basis. Rather, following the lead of other states and a framework set up
by the federal Home Ownership Equity Protection Act,12 New Jersey
designated certain practices abusive where they have little or no market
justification when made in connection with already expensive residential
7

See Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Predatory
Lending Practices: Staff Analysis of Regulators’ Responses (August 23, 2000)
(recommending that no additional regulations of “predatory lending” should be
undertaken because no adequate definition exists to describe the practice); See also
Departments of the Treasury and Housing and Urban Development, Curbing Predatory
Home Mortgage Lending 27 (June 20, 2000) [hereinafter Joint HUD-Treasury Report]
(declining to establish specific definition of “predatory lending” but identifying core
predatory lending practices that should be subject to regulation), available at:
http://www.hud.gov/library/bookshelf18/pressrel/tresrpt.pdf.
8
See, e.g. Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course, Predatory Lending,
Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503,
511-13 (2002) (surveying variety of definitions proposed by scholars and regulators).
Professors Cathy C. Engel and Patricia A. McCoy also demur from offering a precise
definition of predatory lending, choosing instead to classify certain lending practices as
unfair through framework of law economics. Kathleen C. Engel and Patricia A.
McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of Predatory Lending, 80
TEX. L. REV. 1255 (2002). They suggest that predatory behavior includes loans that: (i)
are structured to result in seriously disproportionate net harm to borrowers; (ii) engage
in rent seeking; (iii) involve fraud or deceptive practices; (iv) lack transparency; (v)
require borrowers to waive meaningful legal redress. Id. at 1260.
9
Relying in part on a definition adopted by the New Jersey Appellate Division,
Associates Home Equity Serv., Inc. v. Troup, 343 N.J. Super. 254, 267-8 (App. Div.
2001), the authors would define predatory lending as a set of practices, engaged in by
lenders, mortgage brokers and home improvement contractors, usually through
aggressive or deceptive sales tactics, that are so disadvantageous or abusive that the
borrower is subjected to an unreasonable risk of default and foreclosure.
10
2003 N.J. SESS. LAW SERV. CH. 64 (West), codified at N.J. STAT. ANN.
46:10B-22 (West 2003)
11
See 2003 ARK. ACTS §2598 (2003); CAL. FIN. CODE § 4970-4979.7 (2003);
Fair Lending Act, GA. CODE. ANN. §7-6A-1-13; High Risk Home Loan Act, 2003 ILL.
LAWS S.B. §1784; High Cost Mortgage Loan Provisions, MASS REGS. CODE TIT. 209 §
32-32 (2003); 2003 N.M. LAWS CH. 436; 2001 N.Y. LAWS §11856; Restrictions and
Limitations on on High Cost Home Loans, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1e (2003); High
Cost and Consumer Home Loans Act, 2003 S.C. ACTS § 438.
12
15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2002).
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mortgage loans and where they cause an unreasonable risk of
foreclosure.13
The New Jersey Home Ownership Security Act fills an important
regulatory gap left open by current federal and state law. By attempting
to proscribe certain unjustifiable practices in connection with high-cost,
high-risk loans, the Act goes a long way toward accomplishing its goals
of simultaneously protecting home ownership and keeping an ample
supply of credit available at reasonable terms for all borrowers, including
subprime borrowers.14
In this article, we will first describe the background of the
emerging predatory lending problem by locating the practice in the
broader subprime mortgage lending market; identifying the emergence of
loan terms and practices the New Jersey legislature concluded were
abusive; and documenting the prevalence and consequences of the
predatory lending problem in New Jersey and particularly within its low
income and minority communities. In Part II of the article, we will
provide a detailed analysis of the Act’s provisions, demonstrating
specifically how it is designed to remedy the problem and highlighting
some of its relative strengths and weaknesses. In Part III we will
consider some questions left open by the Act, including whether the Act
could be even more aggressive; whether it will hurt the broader subprime
lending market and the low-income and minority borrowers who often
depend on it; and whether its controversial provisions assigning liability
for Act violations to secondary purchasers of mortgage notes will have a
significant impact on the availability of loans for New Jersey residents.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF PREDATORY LENDING IN NEW JERSEY
A. Explosion Of The Subprime Lending Market
Predatory lending is a distinct and dangerous subset of the
generally positive emergence of subprime lending in the residential
mortgage market. A subprime loan is generally intended to extend credit
to a borrower who, for reasons such as a poor credit record, high debt-toincome ratio, or unstable employment history, cannot qualify for a
conventional or prime mortgage loan.15 Because of the higher costs
associated with subprime borrowers’ ostensibly greater risk of default,
delinquency and foreclosure, subprime loans carry higher interest rates
than conventional loans.16 Studies have estimated that subprime loans
have on average a 2.5 to 4 percentage points higher interest rate than
prime loans.17 Subprime lenders also typically charge higher points and
13

N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25-26.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-23(2)(b) and (c).
15
See JOHN C. WEICHER, THE HOME EQUITY LENDING INDUSTRY: REFINANCING
MORTGAGES FOR BORROWERS WITH IMPAIRED CREDIT 29 (1997).
16
Joint HUD-Treasury Report at 27-28.
17
Id. at 30. See also Cathy L. Mansfield, The Road to Subprime ‘HEL’ Was
Paved with Good Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime
14
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fees– charges assessed at the outset of the loan and paid either in cash or
financed into the overall loan proceeds – to compensate for higher
origination and servicing costs subprime loans are generally believed to
carry.18 Notwithstanding these increased costs, subprime lending is
generally considered to be an extremely positive development, allowing
those traditionally excluded from conventional mortgage borrowing to
access credit for home purchases19 or to access the equity in their homes
for other uses.20
The subprime lending industry, once virtually nonexistent, has
experienced tremendous growth in the past decade. In 1993, only $35
billion in nationwide loans were subprime, accounting for only 3% of
overall mortgage loan originations; by 1998, subprime lending totaled
$160 billion and its share of overall mortgage originations ballooned to
15%.21 Subprime lending has continued its dramatic expansion,
originating $200 billion in mortgages in 2002 across the country.22 New
Jersey has witnessed proportional growth. Between 1993 and 2000, the
number of subprime loans increased in New Jersey from 2,693 to 25,403
and the percentage share of subprime lending in the overall New Jersey
mortgage market increased from 1% to 14%.23 The causes of this
growth are complex and multifaceted. They include the substantial
Home Equity Loan Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473, 533 (2000) (describing her study of
cross section of subprime loans originated between 1996-1999 which averaged 2.2 to
4.06 higher interest rate than prime loans in a comparable period). Within the subprime
market, there are grades assigned from A-, B, C, D to represent progressively higher
credit risks and which are assigned correspondingly higher interest rates. See
WEICHER, supra note __ at 17 (reporting that subprime loans between the period 19961999 were on average 3 percentage points higher than prime loans, but that large
variations, between 2 to 6 percent existed among grades of subprime loans).
18
WEICHER, supra note __ at 67, 69 (describing higher origination costs and
higher servicing costs associated with increased rates of delinquency and foreclosure).
Delinquency and foreclosure rates are much closer, when A- subprime borrowers are
compared to prime borrowers. Id. at 35. As discussed in detail below, however, it is
remains unclear whether subprime loans accurately reflect an inherent market risk of
default associated with their borrowers or whether overly-costly subprime rates and
points and fees actually push borrowers unnecessarily over the brink of default or
foreclosure. See text accompanying infra notes __ to __.
19
Ken Zimmerman, Director of New Jersey Institute for Social Justice, Speech
at the Seton Hall Law School Predatory Lending Conference (June 17, 2003).
20
See Glenn B. Canner, et al. Recent Developments in Home Equity Lending, 84
FED. RES. BULL. 241 (April 1998) (describing some of the benefits of home equity
lending to consumers), available at
www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin/1998/199804lead.pdf.
21
HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note__ at 50.
22
Robert E. Litan, Unintended Consequences: The Risks of Premature State
Regulation of Predatory Lending, available at:
http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/00007106megriyjcceyllhml/PredReport20092.pdf.
23
KEN ZIMMERMAN, ET AL., PREDATORY LENDING IN NEW JERSEY: THE RISING
THREAT TO LOW-INCOME HOMEOWNERS, New Jersey Institute for Social Justice at 5-6
(February 2002) [hereinafter PREDATORY LENDING IN NEW JERSEY], available at
http://www.njisj.org/reports/predatory_lending.html.
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increase in property values – and corresponding availability of leveraged
home equity – across the economic spectrum;24 tax incentives created by
the 1986 Tax Reform Act which retained solely the mortgage interest
rate as a category of tax-deductible consumer interest;25 and the
emergence of nontraditional, nondepository mortgage service providers
such as mortgage brokers, mortgage bankers, finance companies and
even home improvement contractors.26
Perhaps the most important catalyst for the growth of subprime
lending, however, has been the correspondingly accelerating process of
securitizing subprime mortgages and selling them on the secondary
market.27 This process has created a long funding pipeline connecting
individual residential mortgage borrowers, loan originators (including
mortgage brokers, home improvement contractors and an increasing
variety of lending institutions), investment banks and investors of all
kinds. 28
On one end of the pipeline, a mortgage broker arranges financing
for a borrower from any number of mortgage lenders, such as finance
companies, mortgage bankers, banks, thrifts or credit unions.29
Mortgage brokers typically charge points or fees for their services and
thus make a commission off of the total loan amount at closing.30 In
addition, brokers frequently negotiate with lenders to be paid a “yield
spread premium” which represents the difference between the rate the
lender proffered the broker to extend to the borrower and the actual rate
the broker extended to the borrower.31 Home improvement contractors

24

Margo Saunders, The Increase in Predatory Lending and Appropriate
Remedial Actions, 6 N.C. BANKING INST. 111, 119 (2002).
25
Mansfield, supra note __ at 522.
26
HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note___ at 39.
27
See Eggert supra note __ at 534-52. The percentage of subprime mortgages
that were securitized and sold on the secondary market increased from 32 percent in
1994 to 55 percent in 1998, before dropping to 37 percent in 1999. HUD-Treasury
Joint Report, supra note__ at 40 and tbl. 3.4.
28
HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note__ at 35.
29
Mortgage brokers now account for almost fifty percent of all subprime
mortgage originations. The Problem, Impact and Responses: Hearing on Predatory
Mortgage Lending Before Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 106th
Cong. (2001) (testimony of Neill Fendly, Immediate Past President of National
Association of Mortgage Brokers). Brokers are heavily undercapitalized and, as a result
rarely provide use their own funds to extend a loan. HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra
note __ at 40. Rather, they will typically close the loan in the lenders name, use “table
funding” provided by a pre-designated purchaser of the loan, or access a line of credit
from a finance company. Eggert, supra note __ at 538.
30
HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note___at 40.
31
HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note__ at 40. Yield spread premiums
create strong incentives for brokers to steer borrowers to a higher rate and are
particularly problematic when they are not properly disclosed to borrowers in advance
of the loan closing. See Mansfield, supra note __ at 526.
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often also originate mortgages for borrowers with pre-arranged lenders
and are a significant source of abuse in the subprime lending process.32
A lender may hold a loan in its portfolio, collecting monthly
mortgage payments as they come due and servicing the loan in all other
respects. Most subprime lenders, however, securitize their loans. That
is, lenders pool a large group of loans with similar risk grades together,
securitize them and, through Wall Street investment banks, sell them to a
vast secondary market of loan purchasers, which includes institutional
investors, mutual funds and pension funds.33 The enormous growth of
securitization has had an utterly transforming effect on the mortgage
services market. Securitization has simultaneously fueled the growth of
subprime lending and the nontraditional, and comparatively
underregulated, brokers and finance companies that dominate the
market.34 By selling their loans to the secondary market, subprime
lenders do not need to wait for monthly mortgage payments to be made
by borrowers. They thereby become free to finance new subprime
loans.35 With each financing, they collect points and fees, and with each
sale to the secondary market, they collect an interest point spread.36
The secondary market seems highly enamored with subprime
lending because the rates of return are enormously profitable given the
overall risk profile of subprime borrowers.37 As an added benefit to
secondary market investors, and as described below, the secondary
market can take advantage of the holder-in-due-course rule, 38 which
generally immunizes them, as good faith purchasers, from liability for
any fraud perpetrated by a loan originator.39

32

See text accompanying infra notes __ to __.
HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note__ at 41.
34
Eggert, supra note __ at 546.
35
Engel and McCoy, supra note __ at 1274.
36
Mansfield, supra note __ at 531.
37
See Robert E. Litan, Unintended Consequences: The Risks of Premature State
Regulation of Predatory Lending, available at:
http://www.aba.com/NR/rdonlyres/00007106megriyjcceyllhml/PredReport20092.pdf;
Hearing Before the House Comm. on Banking and Financial Services, 106th Cong.
(2000) (testimony of Cathy Lesser Mansfield) [hereinafter Mansfield Testimony]
(arguing that many subprime loans carry unjustified and “tremendously inflated costs”);
see also Thomas Goetz, Loan Sharks, Inc., Village Voice, July 15, 1997 at 33
(“subprime companies say their interest rates are so high to compensate for the greater
risk these borrowers bring. But a welcome side effect of high rates is the profits that
traditional banks can’t hope to match. According to Forbes, subprime consumer
finance companies can enjoy returns up to six times greater than those of the best-run
banks. Corporate America hasn’t failed to notice.”)
38
See generally U.C.C. § 3-302 and text accompanying infra notes __ to __.
39
See text accompanying infra notes __ to __.
33
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B. Predominance Of Subprime Lending In Minority
Communities
Subprime lending is concentrated among low and moderateincome borrowers due in part to their typically lower income-to-asset
ratios and shorter or weaker credit histories.40 More highly troubling,
however, is the remarkable predominance of subprime lending in African
American neighborhoods. Nationwide, fifty percent of all loans in
predominantly African American neighborhoods are subprime,
compared to only nine percent in predominantly white neighborhoods.41
Controlling for income, the disparity is even more stark: upper income
African Americans are twice as likely as low income white borrowers to
receive subprime credit.42 In New Jersey, controlling for income and
other key variables, African Americans are more than three times as
likely as white borrowers to receive a subprime home equity loan; 2.5
times as likely as white borrowers to receive a subprime purchase money
loan to buy a house; and, 1.4 times as likely as white borrowers to
receive a subprime refinance loan.43
These disturbing statistics
demonstrate that much subprime lending is not accurately correlated to
credit risk and corroborates the strong suspicion that much of subprime
lending is predatory – that is, it charges far too high a price for the credit
risk presented by an individual borrower.44
C. The Link Between The Subprime Market And Predatory
Lending
As mentioned, the large majority of subprime loans are neither
predatory or in need of regulation. However, certain lending practices,
when done in connection with an already expensive subprime loan, are
so abusive that they can properly be designated as predatory. One core
feature that these practices have in common is their tendency to unfairly
strip equity from a borrower.
Typical predatory practices pad
unnecessary charges in a loan and thereby decrease the value of the
borrower’s ownership interest in her home.45 As a result, victims of
predatory lending lose their primary – perhaps their only – source of
wealth accumulation to the extent that they are unable to consistently
make their loan payments or that actually causes them to lose their
homes entirely.
40

Department of Housing and Urban Development, Unequal Burden: Income
and Rational Disparities in Subprime America, at 3 (April 12, 2000) [hereinafter
Unequal Burden]. In low to moderate income neighborhoods, 26% of refinance loans
were subprime, compared to a national average of 11% and an average of seven percent
in upper income neighborhoods. Id. In New Jersey, sixty percent of lending in lowincome areas is subprime. PREDATORY LENDING IN NEW JERSEY, supra note __ at 6.
41
Unequal Burden, supra note ___ at 3.
42
Id.
43
PREDATORY LENDING IN NEW JERSEY, supra note __ at 7.
44
See text accompanying infra notes __ to __. (next section)
45
COST OF PREDATORY LENDING, supra note __ at 4-5.
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These practices, it should be noted, are rarely present in the
conventional lending industry or in the legitimate subprime industry.
Indeed, they are present only in the predatory subset of the subprime
lending market – a subset that has captured a significant share of the
subprime market and appears resistant to competition from the legitimate
lending market for a variety of reasons. The most fundamental reason is
that predatory lenders do prey on potential victims: they employ unique,
aggressive and often highly misleading marketing and sales techniques.
In order to identify potential victims, predatory lenders may search
census records to look for predominantly African American tracts; deed
records to identify persons that either own their homes outright or should
have substantial equity in them; and tax records to identify delinquent
persons who may be in need of money.46 Predatory lenders and brokers
then rely on direct marketing techniques – persistent calling or “live
checks” – that are full of misleading enticements that have proven to be
effective with the most vulnerable homeowners. These homeowners
tend to be highly unsophisticated about mortgage products and largely
disconnected from the financial services market.47 As one self-confessed
predatory lender described in testimony to the U.S. Senate, predatory
lenders target “blue-collar workers, people who haven’t gone to college,
older people who are on fixed incomes, non-English-speaking people
and people who have significant equity in their homes.”48 Moreover,
once a predatory lender has secured a victim, his goal is to keep
returning in order to repeatedly flip the victim’s loan, churning
additional fees and stripping additional equity each time.49
Legitimate subprime and conventional lenders do not, as a matter
of course, engage in such aggressive marketing techniques. They tend to
attract borrowers who both need credit and are sophisticated enough to
shop around for their options.50 However, once a borrower has been
trapped in an equity-stripping loan, her loan-to-value ratio is likely too
high to ever allow her to trade up to a legitimate subprime financing.
Some of the most common and most damaging equity-stripping
or otherwise unreasonable lending practices are:
46

ASSOCIATION OF COMMUNITY ORGANIZATIONS FOR REFORM NOW (ACORN),
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL: PREDATORY LENDING IN AMERICA 34-35 (November 2002)
[hereinafter SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL].
47
Id; see also Eggert, supra note __ at 516.
48
EquityPredators: Stripping, Flipping and Packing their Way to Profits:
Hearing Before the Senate Special Committee on Aging, 105th Cong. (1998) (testimony
of “Jim Dough”) [hereinafter Testimony of Jim Dough], available at:
http://aging.senate.gov/events/hr14jd.htm. see also id. (“my perfect customer would be
an uneducated widow who is on a fixed income, hopefully from her deceased husband’s
pension and social security – who has her house paid off, is living off of credit cards,
but having a difficult time keeping up her payments, and who must make a car payment
in addition to her credit card payments”).
49
See infra note __.
50
Engel and McCoy supra note __ at 1289-90.
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1.
Lending Without Regard to Ability to Repay
Predatory lenders often will make a loan based upon the value of
the equity the borrower has in the home but without concern for whether
the borrower has enough income to support monthly mortgage payments.
The practice is sometimes referred to as “asset-based lending.”51 This
practice sets up a borrower for assured default and eventual loss of her
home. Though foreclosure is typically costly and disfavored by
legitimate mortgage lenders,52 participants in the predatory lending
pipeline may be unconcerned about the likelihood of foreclosure on these
loans. Mortgage brokers will have received a commission at the outset
from the loan proceeds (and have been known to exaggerate a
borrower’s credentials when presenting an application for lender
approval); a lender can then immediately securitize and sell the loan to
the secondary market and recover the value of the loan immediately; and
the secondary market investor can still recoup losses because the assetbased lending is typically directed at borrowers who already have
substantial equity in their homes.53 As we shall see below, HOSA does
not directly address this practice.54
2.
Financing Points and Fees
Points and fees charged in connection with predatory loans
routinely amount to between five and eight percent of the loan amount.55
Points and fees can become even costlier because they are not paid in
cash by the borrower but, rather, are financed as part of the total loan
amount. As a result, a subprime borrower will pay the already high
interest associated with her loan to finance the points and fees.56
Financing points and fees can be dangerous because their costs are not
transparent; such financing tends to obscure the true cost of the loan,
particularly when many borrowers do not find out about the financing
process until they are at closing.57 Financing of points and fees can be
51

HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note __ at 76.
WEICHER, supra note __ at 84.
53
Eggert, supra note __ at 550-60.
54
See text accompanying infra notes __ to __.
55
COST OF PREDATORY LENDING, supra note __ at 6 (estimating that 750,000
loans annually have points and fees that are in excess of five percent of the total loan
value); see also SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note __ at 37 (reporting that
borrowers in predatory loans are “routinely” charged just under eight percent of the
loan amount in points and fees), available at
http://www.acorn.org/acorn10/predatorylending/plreports/report.htm. By contrast the
average points and fees charged on conventional loans, if any are charged, is 1.1%.
56
Mansfield Testimony, supra note __ (“the combination of high points and fees
in a refinance loan and high rates translate into exorbitantly higher costs for the
borrower - much higher than they would be if the borrower were lent the second
mortgage or unsecured credit product he/she sought in the first place”).
57
COST OF PREDATORY LENDING, supra note __ at 4; Ken Zimmerman, Director
of New Jersey Institute for Social Justice, Speech at the Seton Hall Law School
Predatory Lending Conference (June 17, 2003).
52
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particularly abusive when combined with other equity stripping devices
such as loan flipping, which is described below.
3.
Prepayment Penalties
Prepayment penalties are charges a borrower must pay if she
wishes to pay off or refinance a loan, either through the same lender or a
different one, before the loan term is complete.58 Prepayment penalties
are virtually nonexistent in the prime industry where competition has
mostly ended this practice. Seventy percent of loans in the subprime
market, however, contain prepayment penalties of approximately five
percent of the total loan amount.59 Because prepayment penalties in a
refinance are typically financed as part of the new loan rather than paid
at closing, they drive up the cost of the new loan and thereby deplete a
borrower’s equity.60 They are particularly objectionable where, as is
frequently the case, a borrower was not aware of the prepayment
provision in her initial loan.61 HOSA does not directly limit imposition
of prepayment penalties, but does indirectly address the issue by putting
a cap on the amount of points that can be refinanced along with high cost
loans.
4.
Packing Single Premium Insurance Products
Predatory lenders often “pack” unnecessary and costly insurance
products to pay off the borrower’s loan in the event of sickness,
disability or death, into subprime loans and finance them without the
borrower’s informed consent.62 Unlike traditional insurance premiums,
which are paid on a monthly basis, subprime mortgage insurance
products are frequently sold as “single premium” in which five years
worth of premiums are paid up front in one lump sum, but financed over
the (usually longer) term of the loan. Such single premium credit
insurance is abusive because its cost is rarely properly disclosed to
borrowers:63 it is estimated to cost up to four to five times as much as
unfinanced premium insurance that the borrower pays periodically.64
Indeed, a leading consumer advocacy group has called the financing of
single premium credit insurance “the worst insurance rip off in the
country.”65
58

HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note__ at 90.
HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note__at 92.
60
COST OF PREDATORY LENDING, supra note __ at 8 (estimating that prepayment
penalties on subprime loans cost borrowers $2.3 billion a year).
61
Id.
62
HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note__ at 86-88.
63
COST OF PREDATORY LENDING, supra note __ at 6.
64
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note __ at 42. In addition, lenders have
strong incentives to pack such insurance products because they receive an average of
30% commission from the insurance company on the sale. COST OF PREDATORY
LENDING, supra note __ at 7.
65
Consumers Union, Credit Insurance: The $2 Billion A Year Rip-Off (March
1999), available at http://www.consumersunion.org/finance/credit_info_page.htm.
59
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5.
Loan Flipping
Loan flipping refers to the practice of repeatedly refinancing a
borrower’s loan (typically within the first few years of the loan term)
with a fee-loaded loan, without reasonable benefit to the borrower.66
Subprime borrowers are frequently solicited by predatory lenders to
refinance their loans with assurances that their monthly payments will be
lower (by extending the loan term) or suggestions that they could use
cash to consolidate other consumer debts. The refinancings typically
contain high points and fees as well as prepayment penalties, which
provide additional revenue to lenders and brokers, but materially deplete
the equity that borrowers retains in their home.67 Flipping depends on
the skill and confidence of individual lender representatives or brokers,
who are persistent in winning the trust of consumers and otherwise
assuring them that the time is especially right to take advantage of
refinancing.68 Indeed, loan flipping is a core weapon in predatory
lenders’ arsenal. Their ultimate goal is to lock a borrower into one
abusive loan, and return over and over to the borrower to siphon equity
out of her home and into their own pockets.69 Once a borrower is
trapped in this equity-depleting cycle, it becomes next to impossible to
escape by refinancing with a legitimate lender on favorable terms.
6.

Balloon Payments, Advance Payments, Default
Interest Rates and Discretionary Call Provisions
Balloon payments are traditionally a full lump sum payment that
occurs at the end of the fixed loan repayment term, which pays off the
remainder of what the previous monthly payments did not fully cover.70
Frequently, victims of predatory lending are either deceived about the
existence of a balloon provision in their loan; or such borrowers are
falsely reassured that they can refinance at a lower rate in the future
when, in fact, predatory lenders will use an impending balloon payment

66

HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note__ at 73.
For example, in Cammarano v. Associates, Civ. No. F-13509-97 (Chanc. Div.,
Hudson Cty), a woman obtained a $28,000 home equity loan from Associates. After
the Ms. Cammarano had difficulty making her payments, Associates initiated contact
with her and refinanced the loan three times in two years, increasing her total
indebtedness to $56,000, which was primarily comprised of points and fees.
68
Engel and McCoy, supra note __ at 1283 (“[p]redatory lenders … endear
themselves with charm and guile. They consciously exude an aura of expertise and
success, intimidating customers from questioning the advisability of the loans they are
offering”).
69
Testimony of Jim Dough, supra note __ (explaining that predatory finance
companies “require branch employees to make contact every three months with
customers to prevent payoffs and up-sell to bigger loans. At some of my branches, we
tried to call every one of our real estate customers at least once a month. The purpose
of these contacts was to flip as many loans as possible. Our tactic was to try to gain the
trust and confidence of the customer”).
70
HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note__ at 96.
67
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to force the borrower to accept the flip of the loan so that the lender can
extract additional points and fees.71
Advance payment provisions require that borrowers prepay a
certain amount of interest at closing that would otherwise be payable
over the course of the loan.72 Default interest rate provisions, which
substantially increase the interest rate owed upon any default -sometimes by amounts up to 40% -- can be deeply unfair because they
make it very difficult for a borrower to cure a default and set them up for
quick foreclosure or refinancing at outrageous terms.73 Call provisions
allow a lender to demand payment of the full loan amount at the lenders’
sole discretion.74 All three provisions are typically included without the
borrowers’ knowledge and understanding.75 These provisions also
provide an unscrupulous lender the excuse to initiate contact and the
leverage to coerce a borrower to refinance with another high-fee loan in
order to avoid application of those devastating terms.
7.
Negative Amortization
Negative amortization is a type of loan structure in which the
monthly payments do not even cover interest charges, causing the
principal to increase – rather than decrease – over the life of the loan.76
Because negative amortization causes a borrower to steadily lose equity
each month, it is virtually never in a borrower’s interest to accept such a
loan term.
Not surprisingly, many borrowers report that their
unscrupulous lenders did not explain how such loan structure would
work.77
8.
Home Improvement Contractor Abuse
Unscrupulous home improvement contractors frequently pass
through poor and minority neighborhoods looking for homes that are in
disrepair and therefore susceptible to a home improvement pitch.78 The
contractors will offer to arrange financing with a pre-arranged lender,
who agrees to pay the contractor directly from the loan proceeds.
Because the borrower is not directly paying the contractor, she has no
leverage over the timing or quality of the contractor’s work. As a result,
unscrupulous contractors can walk away with substantial payments, but
leaving the promised repairs unfinished, shabbily done or even

71

SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note __ at 41.
See NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, STOP PREDATORY LENDING: A
GUIDE FOR LEGAL ADVOCATES 46 (2002) ("Some lenders collect these payments
upfront at closing to disguise the real amount of credit extended to increase the
consumer's obligation to pay interest.").
73
National Consumer Law Center, TRUTH IN LENDING § 10.4.3 (4th ed. 1999).
74
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note __ at 40.
75
Id.
76
HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note __ at 91.
77
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note __ at 41.
78
SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL, supra note __ at 39.
72
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unattempted, and leaving the borrower with an unwanted and abusive
home equity loan from the complicit lender.79
D. Predatory Lending’s Wake: An Epidemic Of Foreclosures
Predatory lending has real, measurable and significantly more
negative consequences than those associated with other types of
consumer fraud. It has caused a rash of foreclosures in New Jersey,
causing devastating financial and emotional harm to individual victims
and rippling damage throughout the low-income and minority
neighborhoods where predatory practices are concentrated.
For example, in Essex County, New Jersey, the number of
residential foreclosures increased from 1,701 in 1995 to 2,516 in 2000 as
the percentage share of those foreclosures attributable to subprime loans
increased from 18.8% to 29.6%.80 The data appears to demonstrate that
foreclosures have not merely tracked the increase in overall subprime
lending, but that subprime and predatory lending has prematurely forced
disproportionately greater numbers of foreclosures. For example,
between 1995 and 2000, the rate of subprime foreclosures was double
the rate of subprime originations in Northern New Jersey counties. At
the same time, the speed at which loans went into foreclosure – a result
of loans that were unmanageable from the start or had serious equity
stripping practices – increased dramatically. The average age of a loan
in foreclosure dropped from 6.7 years in 1995 to 4.0 years half a decade
later.81 The highest concentrations of defaults are in largely African
American sections of southern and western Newark, Irvington and East
Orange.82
A foreclosure on a residential home puts a family through a
devastating period of emotional and financial distress.83 In addition,
when foreclosures are concentrated in particular neighborhoods, oncehealthy communities suffer from the externalities associated with largely
abandoned tracts of land: a decrease in overall property values, an

79

HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note __ at 39.
PREDATORY LENDING IN NEW JERSEY, supra note __ at 8. In the first half of
2001, foreclosures increased an additional 15%. According to the study, these figures
are significantly understated because they do not take into account foreclosures
accomplished by secondary holders of mortgage notes, which represents approximately
half of all subprime mortgage note holders. Id.
81
Id. at 6, 8.
82
Id. at 8.
83
WEICHER, supra note __ at 84 (acknowledging that “[t]he consequences [home
foreclosure] can be tragic – the loss of a home that may represent all the assets of a
family, the necessity of uprooting the family and moving to a less desirable residence”);
Eggert, supra note __ at 581 (describing range of devastating emotions and problems
encountered by families subjected to home foreclosure).
80
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increase in crime, and a corresponding need for greater law enforcement
and other government services.84
The explosion of foreclosures caused by predatory lending
appears more tragic when one considers that the vast majority of victims
of predatory lending already owned their homes. Over 80% of subprime
lending is not for the purchase of a home, but rather primarily for cashout refinancings or to consolidate debt.85 Thus, many homeowners are
losing their houses because a complex and new form of consumer debt
products has been sold to them on utterly unreasonable terms.86
E.
The Limitations Of Pre-HOSA Remedies
In enacting HOSA, New Jersey recognized that the phenomenon
of predatory lending was too broad and persistent to be controlled by
pre-existing remedies. State law misrepresentation remedies typically
reach only outright misrepresentation by lenders. Federal disclosure
statutes, such as the Truth in Lending Act, are utterly ineffective in
warning borrowers about all the pitfalls of predatory loans. Moreover,
the federal high cost home loan statute upon which HOSA builds – the
Home Ownership Equity Protection Act – includes too small a
proportion of home loans within its regulatory scope.
Moreover, much of the effectiveness of these remedies is actually
eliminated by the common law holder-in-due-course doctrine, which
largely insulates the good faith purchasers of predatory loans from
liability for the illegal conduct of loan originators. As described below,
HOSA increases loan disclosure requirements, bolsters current consumer
fraud protections in the home loan area, supplements protections for
classes of high cost loans and, very importantly, eliminates in many
cases, the liability barriers created by the holder-in-due-course doctrine.
1.
Pre-HOSA Remedies
The New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”),87 though
considered one of the most consumer-friendly statutes in the nation,88
only applies to misrepresentations, material omissions, or overall
unconscionable conduct.89 While such conduct is obviously present in
84

Senate Special Committee on Aging, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of William
J. Brennan, Jr. Director, Home Defense Program of the Atlanta Legal Aid Society,
Inc.).
85
Of the 80% of subprime loans that are used for refinancing, 59% are cash-out
loans. HUD-Treasury Joint Report, supra note __ at 31.
86
Mansfied Testimony, supra note __ (emphasizing that a large proportion of
subprime foreclosures result from subprime debt consolidation refinancings that were
misunderstood by the borrower, not really needed or on unfair terms).
87
N.J. STAT. ANN. 56:8-2.
88
Cox v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 138 N.J. 2, 15 (1994) (noting that New Jersey
has “one of the strongest consumer protection laws in the nation” and should be
“construed liberally in favor of consumers.”) The Consumer Fraud Act mandates treble
damages and attorneys fees. N.J. STAT. ANN. 56:8-2.
89
Lemelledo v. Beneficial Mgt. Corp. of America, 289 N.J. Super. 489 (1996).
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many predatory loans – though notoriously difficult to prove – the
Consumer Fraud Act does little to prohibit predatory practices such as
asset-based lending, loan flipping, insurance fee packing, and financing
excessive points and fees. In addition, CFA claims cannot be asserted
against the substantial number of secondary market holders of predatory
mortgage notes, either as an affirmative claim or as a defense to
foreclosure because the holder-in-due-course rule immunizes a good
faith purchaser of a note from most claims that could have been asserted
against a loan originator, no matter how meritorious the claim is.90
Second, the federal Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”) mandates
certain important disclosures in connection with a home loan including
the annual percentage rate (APR), the total amount financed which must
include a calculation of points and fees charged, the monthly payment
amount and number of payments necessary to pay off the loan entirely.91
It also authorizes actual damages, statutory damages of double the
finance charge and attorneys fees for any violations.92 However, TILA
offers too little in the fight against predatory lending – it fails to include
more obvious and less technical disclosures that much of the
unsophisticated population that succumbs to predatory lenders needs; too
late – the TILA disclosures are made at the loan closing when a borrower
has already psychologically committed; and too confusing – the
disclosures come included in a bewildering stack of loan documents.93
In sum, TILA is not sufficient, standing alone, to warn vulnerable
borrowers about the true costs of a loan.
Finally, in 1994, Congress enacted the Home Ownership Equity
Protection Act (“HOEPA”), which placed direct limits on certain
practices if made in connection with a “high cost loan.”94 Specifically,
HOEPA protections apply if a loan meets one of two high cost loan
triggers: (i) where the APR exceeds by eight percent the yield on
Treasury securities of comparable maturity for first lien loans (or above
ten percent for subordinate lien loans) (the “rate trigger” or “APR
trigger”); or (ii) where the total of all the loan’s points and fees exceeds
eight percent of the loan total or $400 (adjusted for inflation), whichever
is greater (the “fee trigger”).95 Regulation Z, promulgated under
HOEPA by the Federal Reserve Board, specifies which charges count as
90

See text accompanying infra notes __ to __. .
15 U.S.C. § 1638.
92
15 USC §1640(a)(1)-(3).
93
See generally Christopher L. Peterson, Truth, Understanding and High Cost
Consumer Credit: The Historical Context of the Truth in Lending Act, 55 FLA. L. REV.
807, 881-83 (2003) (describing serious problems TILA has for controlling fraud in the
home loan context).
94
15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2002)
95
15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1), 3 (2000), 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i) (2002). The fee
trigger was lowered by Federal Reserve Board in 2001, from ten percent above
comparable Treasury securities (for either first or second lien loans). 66 Fed. Reg.
65606, 65608-65610 (Dec. 20, 2001).
91
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points and fees to be included in the fee trigger and includes
compensation to a mortgage broker in the form of a yield spread
premium96 and, after recent amendments to Regulation Z, optional credit
insurance.97
HOEPA prohibits inclusion of certain loan terms in high cost
loans that tend to be predatory. For such loans, HOEPA prohibits
negative amortization without exception,98 balloon payments on loans
with terms of five or fewer years,99 loan terms that increase the interest
rate in the event of a default,100 and prepayment penalties in certain cases
for financially vulnerable borrowers.101 HOEPA creditors are prohibited
from engaging in asset-based lending – lending without regard to a
borrower’s ability to pay102 – but only if they have engaged in a “pattern
or practice of such activity.”103 Recent amendments to Regulation Z also
place limits on loan flipping: creditors or their affiliates are forbidden
from refinancing a HOEPA-covered loan within a year, unless the
refinancing is “in the borrowers’ interest.”104 Damages for violations of
HOEPA include all those available under TILA plus enhanced statutory

96

15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(4)(B), 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(b)(1)(ii).
12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(ii), (b)(1)(iv). Real estate charges such as title
insurance, filing and recording fees must also be included unless the charges are
reasonable, offers no direct or indirect compensation to the creditor, and is paid to a
third party unaffiliated with the creditor. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(b)(iii).
98
15 U.S.C. § 1539(f); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(2).
99
15 U.S.C. § 1639(e); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(1); Official Staff Commentary, §
226.32(c)(3). For loan terms that exceed five years, balloon payments are permissible,
but must be disclosed. See text accompanying supra note __.
100
15 U.S.C. § 1639(d); 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(d)(4).
101
Prepayment penalties are permitted only if (i) the loan will not cause the
borrower to pay more than fifty percent of their income to the monthly payments; (ii)
income and expenses are verified by financial statement signed by the consumer and
supported by a credit report; (iii) creditor is not refinancing one of its own or an
affiliate’s loans; (iv) if it occurs within the first five years of the loan; and (v) the
penalty is legal under state law. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c).
102
HOEPA defines this conduct as extending credit “based on the consumer’s
collateral without regard to the consumers’ repayment ability, including the consumers’
current and expected income, current obligations, and employment.” 15 U.S.C. §
1639(h).
103
Traditionally, the pattern or practice element of the prohibition has been a hard
one for plaintiffs to satisfy, requiring proof of several instances of prohibited conduct in
short period of time. Newton v. United Companies Financial Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d
444, 457 (E.D. Pa. 1998). The recent amendments have loosened the requirement
somewhat, creating a presumptive violation where the lender has failed to document
and verify the borrower’s ability to pay. 66 Fed. Reg. 65606, 65608-65610 (Dec. 20,
2001).
104
12 C.F.R. § 226.34(a)(3) (2002). In considering whether a refinancing is in
the borrower’s interest, Regulation Z instructs lenders to consider the totality of the
borrower’s circumstances at the time the credit was extended. Id.
97
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damages in the amount of the sum of all finance charges and fees paid by
the consumer.105
HOEPA’s scope, however, is narrow in two important respects.
First, HOEPA does not cover purchase money mortgages (that is, those
used to purchase homes) or open-end lines of credit (such as home equity
lines of credit).106 Moreover, as consumer advocates have been arguing
for years, the HOEPA high cost loan triggers are too high. Predatory
lenders are notoriously successful for offering loans at rates and with
points and fees just below the high HOEPA triggers and thereby evading
regulation. 107
2.

Holder-in-due-course Rule’s Elimination of
Assignee Liability
Another significant limitation on remedies available to victims of
predatory lending is the Uniform Commercial Code’s holder-in-duecourse rule.108 The rule insulates noteholders in the secondary market
from most defenses by borrowers – including fraud-related ones – which
the borrower could have raised against the original creditor.109 The FTC
has fully abrogated the holder-in-due course rule’s application to the sale
of “consumer goods,” which makes the rule unavailable to assignees of
loans involving manufactured homes or home improvements.110
Similarly, HOEPA has abrogated the rule for loans it covers, making
good faith assignees potentially liable for all claims and subject to all
defenses a debtor could have raised against the loan originator unless the
assignee can demonstrate that “a reasonable person exercising due

105

15 U.S.C. § 1640(a). HOEPA, like TILA, has a one-year statute of limitations
for affirmative suits, but can be raised any time – including against assignees – as a
defense to foreclosure. 15 U.S.C. §. 1640(c).
106
Open-end credit is a credit extension where the exact amount of money lent or
advanced at any given time is not fixed. 15 U.S.C. §1602(i). It is, in short, a line of
credit. In order to qualify as an open-end loan, TILA and Regulation Z require that
creditors demonstrate that their credit plan meet three specific elements. A creditor
under a plan must: (i) reasonably contemplate repeated transactions; (ii) may impose a
finance charge from time to time on an outstanding unpaid balance; and (iii) generally
replenishes the amount of credit available to the consumer to the extent that any
outstanding balance is repaid. 15 U.S.C. §1602(i); 12 C.F.R. §226.2(a)(20). Open-end
lines of credit are being more frequently used in the home loan context.
107
TRUTH IN LENDING supra note __ at §10.1.1.
108
U.C.C. §3-302 (2003). The rule applies to purchasers of mortgages if they are:
(1) a holder; (2) of a negotiable note; (3) who took the note for value; (4) in good faith;
(5) without notice of the defenses to the note. See JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S.
SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §14-2 (4th ed. 1995).
109
The only “real” defenses that survive the protections for good faith
noteholders are severely limited. They include infancy, duress, lack of legal capacity or
illegality of transaction, fraud in the factum involving, for example, forged signature,
insolvency of the debtor. WHITE AND SUMMERS, supra note __ §14-10.
110
FTC Holder in Due Course Regulations, 16 C.F.R. § 433.2 (1978).
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diligence” could not have revealed that the loan was covered by
HOEPA.111
Nevertheless, in the large category of non-HOEPA home
purchase or refinance loans that are sold to the secondary market, the
holder-in-due-course rule poses a substantial impediment to borrowers
seeking redress for predatory loans and likewise renders them virtually
helpless to contest foreclosures brought by secondary market mortgage
noteholders, no matter how abusive or fraudulent the underlying loan.112
As a result, the holder-in-due course rule creates little incentive for the
secondary market to police predatory practices of loan originators.
Consumer advocates have persistently argued, therefore, that for any
remedy for predatory lending to be fully effective, it must include a
provision that imposes liability against assignees of abusive loans both to
offer borrowers protection against foreclosure and to force the secondary
market to cut off funding to predatory lenders.113
II. THE NEW JERSEY HOME OWNERSHIP SECURITY ACT: ATTEMPTING
TO CURB THE WORST AND PROTECT THE BEST OF THE SUBPRIME
MARKET
On May 1, 2003, Governor James McGreevey signed the New
Jersey Home Ownership Security Act (“HOSA” or the “Act”) into
law.114 It will apply to most New Jersey purchase money and home
equity loans that close on or after November 27, 2003.115 The stated
purpose of the Act is to “encourage lending at reasonable rates with
reasonable terms” so as to strengthen the viability of many communities
and increase home ownership.116 HOSA is designed to accomplish this
goal by prohibiting certain mortgage lending practices deemed either
categorically unjustifiable or abusive when made in connection with
loans that already have very high interest rates or points and fees
structures. Consumer advocates consider the Act a landmark measure
that will protect New Jersey’s most financially vulnerable homeowners
from predatory lenders and offer a reprieve against the rash of unfair
111
15 U.S.C. § 1641(d)(1). Due diligence requires that the purchaser examine all
loan documentation required by TILA plus the itemization of amount financed and any
other disclosures. TRUTH IN LENDING, supra note __, §10.7.2 (4th ed. 1999).
112
See, Eggert, supra note __ at __ -__ (discussing substantial costs securitization
and the holder-in-due-course rule have imposed in the subprime mortgage market).
113
See, e.g. Eggert, supra note __ at 617 (“the surest solution to the problem of
predatory lending is to force the markets that fund subprime lenders to police those
lenders, and the surest way to force this private policing effort is to ensure that the
buyers of predatory loans bear any risk of loss associated with the sharp practices of the
lender, rather than having that loss borne by the lender.”)
114
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-22, et seq. (2003).
115
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-35(15) (2003); see N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-31 (10)
(2003); N.J. Department of Banking and Insurance Bulletin No. 03-15, at 1 (July 25,
2003).
116
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-23(2)(b)-(c) (2003).
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home foreclosures that are concentrated in New Jersey’s minority and
low-income neighborhoods.117
Members of the subprime lending industry, argue that the Act is
unnecessary in light of existing remedies and may even be
counterproductive, but nevertheless agree that the Act will significantly
alter subprime lending practices in the state.118 Industry representatives
also argue that the Act is ambiguous and fails to give creditors sufficient
guidance as to how they should comply with the new law.119 The
subprime lending industry has looked to the New Jersey Department of
Banking and Insurance (“DOBI”) for additional guidance. But, while the
New Jersey legislature has given DOBI significant investigatory and
enforcement powers under the Act,120 it has granted DOBI only limited
regulatory authority to interpret the Act.121
Indeed, DOBI has only been authorized to promulgate
regulations to effectuate the Act’s provisions relating to (i) mandatory
disclosure notices and loan counseling programs for prospective High
Cost Home Loan borrowers and (ii) additional consumer counseling and
awareness programs for all prospective Home Loan borrowers. DOBI,
notwithstanding its lack of statutory authority, has issued a Bulletin to
provide guidance to potential creditors as to the meaning of a number of

117

See, e.g., Ken Zimmerman and Linda Fisher, Progress in the Fight against
Predatory Lending, THE NEWARK STAR-LEDGER, May 16, 2003, at 23 (023 2003 WL
55555939); see also Editorial, Predatory Lending, NEW JERSEY LAW JOURNAL, May
12, 2003 (NJ enacts a “national model in state legislative efforts to combat the range of
abusive mortgage lending practices collectively referred to as predatory lending.”);
MBANJ Backs Compromise, Origination News, April 2003.
118
Jim Goryeb, Loan Law is a Bad Risk for Jersey, THE NEWARK STAR-LEDGER,
May 9, 2003 at __ (031 2003 WL 19921382).
119
ReedSmith, LLP, A. 75 New Jersey’s New Anti-Predatory Lending Law, Client
Bulletin 2003-37, at 6 (May 2003), available at
http://www.reedsmith.co.uk/library/publicationMore.cfm?currentpage=2&catid=14&ar
chive=1.
120
The Act provides DOBI with significant investigatory powers. See N.J. STAT.
ANN. 46:10B-28(7)(a)-(c). It also provides DOBI with substantial remedial powers for
violations of the Act, authorizing DOBI to: impose civil penalties of up to $10,000 for
each offense, suspend, revoke or refuse to renew any license issued by DOBI; remove
from her position a person responsible for a violation of the Act; order a person to cease
and desist from any violation of the Act and make restitution to borrowers for damages;
and any other conditions that the Department deems necessary and appropriate. N.J.
STAT. ANN. 46:10B-28(7)(d) (2003).
121
When the Act was initially pre-filed for introduction into the 2002 New Jersey
legislative session, it contained the language, “the Commissioner of Banking and
Insurance shall promulgate regulations pursuant to the "Administrative Procedure Act,"
P.L.1968, c.410 (C.52:14B-1 et seq.) necessary to effectuate the provisions of this act.”
Bill S. 2187 § 12 as Introduced and Referred To Senate Commerce Committee (Mar. 8,
2001) (emphasis added). This language clearly granted DOBI a broad mandate to
interpret the Act. The final version of the bill, however, was revised to read, “necessary
to effectuate the provisions of subsections f. and g. of section 5 and section 11 of this
act.” N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-35(14) (2003).
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the Act’s ambiguous provisions.122 While such guidelines are not
binding, they have some persuasive authority, given DOBI’s mandate to
protect and educate “consumers and promotes the growth, financial
stability and efficiency of” the banking industry.123 Nonetheless, where
DOBI’s guidance is inconsistent with the plain text of the Act (as we
demonstrate in several places in this Article), its authority is obviously
significantly reduced.
A. The Act’s Scope: Regulating Most Home Loans A Little, But
High Cost Home Loans A Lot
The Act designates three classes of loans – “home loans,”
“covered loans,” and “high cost loans” – and subjects creditors who issue
them, as well as the secondary market investors who purchase them, to
increasing levels of regulation. The New Jersey legislature concluded
that the Act’s prohibitions on practices associated with the extremely
broad category of Home Loans, such as financing single premium credit
insurance and encouraging borrowers to default, are per se unreasonable
in the mortgage context and can virtually never be economically
justified.124 The legislature also appears to have recognized that high
cost loans, ones that have either very high rates or points and fees
structures, render borrowers increasingly susceptible to default and
foreclosure and, at the same time, are typically extended to borrowers
that are low-income, financially unsophisticated, and thereby particularly
vulnerable to the abuses of predatory lenders. Accordingly, the Act bans
numerous additional loan terms when made in connection with high cost
loans, such as balloon payments, negative amortizations, default interest
rates, while also mandating clear disclosures and, in certain cases, loan
counseling.125 Undoubtedly reflecting a legislative compromise, the Act
bans the particularly dangerous practice of loan flipping for “Covered
Home Loans,” a category somewhat broader than high cost loans.
1.
Application to Creditors
The Act only governs only Home Loans made by “creditors,”
defined as those who extend consumer credit that is (i) subject to a
finance charge or (ii) payable by five or more installments and to whom
the obligation is payable at any time.126 This definition appears intended
to screen out informal lenders, such as family members who do not
extend “consumer credit.” Notably, the term “creditor” also includes
mortgage brokers as well as anyone who directly or indirectly solicits,
processes, places or negotiates Home Loans for others, which ensures
that all parties who are involved in arranging financing are subject to its
prohibitions and penalties.127 It also ensures that those who finance – but
do not arrange –Home Loans cannot avoid regulation by assigning
various lending tasks, such as solicitation and origination to different
122
123

N.J. Department of Banking and Insurance Bulletin No. 03-15 (July 25, 2003).
DOBI Mission Statement, at http://www.state.nj.us/dobi/dobimiss.htm.

21

MODEL RESPONSE TO PREDATORY LENDING
entities.128 This broad definition of creditor appears to include home
improvement contractors and manufactured home sellers who have
significant involvement in arranging a Home Loan.129
2.
Three Tiers of Home Loan Coverage
The Act classifies three types of residential mortgage loans and
subjects each to different levels of regulation. First, the Act defines the
very broad category of “Home Loans” as extensions of credit to
borrowers secured by either: (i) a mortgage or deed of trust on real estate
for a one-to-six family dwelling that is or will be occupied by the
borrower as her principal dwelling; or (ii) a security interest in a
“manufactured home”130 which is or will be occupied by a borrower as
her principal dwelling.131 Exceeding the scope of protections offered by
HOEPA, the Act also covers purchase money mortgages (for initial
home purchases) and open-ended lines of credit;132 like HOEPA, the Act
does excludes “reverse mortgage transactions” from its regulatory

124

N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (2003).
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(a)-(g) (2003).
126
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Creditors”) (2003).
127
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Creditors”) (2003).
While including mortgage brokers within the definition of “Creditor,” the Act
also provides a meaningful limitation for the scope of that liability:
125

Notwithstanding any provision of this act to the contrary, a mortgage
broker shall be
liable under the provisions of this act only for acts performed by the
mortgage broker in the course of providing mortgage brokering
services. However, a mortgage broker may be held liable for acts
performed by the mortgage broker outside the scope of mortgage
brokering services if the acts are related to the purchasing or the
making of a home loan and are otherwise prohibited under this act.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-33(12) (2003). Thus, a mortgage broker acting qua
mortgage broker is only liable for her own violations of the Act and is not
jointly and severally liable along with the creditor for the creditor’s actions.
The Act also excludes from the definition of creditor, attorneys and title
insurers who are unaffiliated with the lender. Id.
128
See Eggert, supra note__ at (describing how lending industry structures itself
to avoid liability to borrowers).
129
See N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Creditor”) (2003).
130
The category of manufactured homes includes modular homes, panelized
homes, pre-cut homes, and mobile homes. Manufactured Home Institute Website, at
http://www.manufacturedhousing.org/lib/showtemp_detail.asp?id=74&cat=1 (last
visited August 29, 2003).
131
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Home Loan”) (2003).
132
Open-end credit plans represent a credit extension where the exact amount of
money lent or advanced at any given time is not fixed. See 15 U.S.C. §1602(i) (2003).
Because open-end home equity lines of credit have been increasingly utilized by
borrowers, including subprime borrowers, HOSA’s express regulation of such loans is a
significant increase of scope over that of HOEPA. See supra note __.
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scope.133 The large majority of residential mortgage loans in New Jersey
would fall into the Act’s classification of Home Loans. By definition,
Home Loans include the more restrictive categories of Covered Home
Loans and High Cost Home Loans, which are described below.
Second, the Act classifies certain subset of Home Loans as
“Covered Home Loans,” which are defined by reference to a points and
fees trigger that is lower than those for High Cost Loans (defined below)
and therefore covers a broader proportion of high-fee loans. Covered
Home Loans are Home Loans where the total points and fees payable in
connection with the loan exceed (i) four percent of the total loan amount
for loans of more than $40,000 or (ii) four and a half percent of the total
loan amount if it is $40,000 or less or if it is insured by the Fair Housing
Administration (“FHA”) or guaranteed by the Department of Veterans
Affairs (“VA”).134 Excluded from the definition of points and fees are
conventional prepayment penalties or not more than two “bona fide
discount points” (“BFDP,” defined below).135 The definition of Covered
Home Loans contains no cap for the principal amount of such loans. In
addition, by definition, Covered Home Loans include all High Cost
Home Loans.136
Finally, “High Cost Home Loans” – the narrowest and most
heavily regulated subset of loans – are Home Loans with a principal
amount of less than $350,000 (such amount to be adjusted annually)137
that, like a HOEPA-covered loan, exceeds a specified interest rate or
points and fees threshold. The interest rate threshold under HOSA is
defined by incorporating the APR triggers set by HOEPA and the
Federal Reserve Board’s Regulation Z.138 Thus, HOSA’s interest rate
133

Reverse mortgage transactions are mortgages that reverse the direction of
payments. They are typically used by older homeowners, who can borrow against the
substantial equity in their homes to receive periodic cash payments. Repayment of the
loan amount is not required until the borrower transfers the dwelling, ceases to occupy
it as a primary residence or dies. See Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(bb)
(2003).
134
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Covered Home Loan”) (2003).
135
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Covered Home Loan”) (2003). For example,
(and excluding up to two bona fide discount points), a $100,000 Home Loan would be a
Covered Home Loan if its points and fees were more than $4,000; a $10,000 Home
Loan would be a Covered Home Loan if its points and fees were more than $450; and a
$100,000 VA or FHA Home Loan would be a Covered Home Loan if its points and
fees were more than $4,500.
136
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Covered Home Loan” (2)) (2003).
137
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“High Cost Home Loan”) (2003). The
$350,000 threshold will be adjusted each year to include the last published increase of
the housing component of the national Consumer Price Index, NY-Northeastern NJ
Region. By way of example, that component increased 4% from July 2002 to July
2003. United States Department of Labor, New York-Northern New Jersey CPI Up 0.4
Percent In July; 3.0 Percent Increase From Year Ago (available at
http://www.bls.gov/ro2/cpinynj.htm). Last checked August 29, 2003.
138
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Threshold” (1)) (2003). See 15 U.S.C. §
1602(aa) (2003); 12 C.F.R. § 262.32 (2003). This determination is made without
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trigger, like HOEPA’s, is eight percent above the prevailing interest rate
on a Treasury security of a comparable maturity for first lien mortgages,
and ten percent above the prevailing Treasury security rate for a second
lien mortgage.139 At the time HOSA was enacted (May 1, 2003), a
twenty- year fixed interest Treasury security (the relevant comparable
security for a thirty year mortgage) carried an interest rate of 4.93%.140
Accordingly, under both HOEPA and HOSA, only those loans with an
APR of 12.93% or higher would be classified and regulated as High Cost
Loans.141 Indeed, the High Cost Loan threshold averages approximately
a full seven percent above the national average interest rate of 5.7% for a
fixed rate 30-year home loan measured at the time of HOSA’s passage142
and, therefore covers a narrow category of very expensive loans.
Under HOSA, the classification and heavy regulation of a home
loan as a High Cost Home Loan is also triggered if the loan meets a
certain “total points and fees threshold.”143 HOEPA’s points and fees
threshold is set fairly high, at eight percent of the total loan value.144
regard to whether the loan transaction is or may be a “Residential Mortgage
Transaction,” as defined in 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(24) (2003). N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B24(3) (“Threshold”(1)) (2003). A Residential Mortgage Transaction is a loan to finance
the acquisition or initial construction of a principal dwelling. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a) (24)
(2003). While such types of loans do not fall within the ambit of HOEPA, they do fall
within that of HOSA. Thus, HOSA, unlike HOEPA, applies to purchase money and
construction mortgages for primary dwellings.
139
See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1) (2003), 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i) (2003).
HOEPA’s APR trigger had been lowered by the Federal Reserve Board in 2001, from a
threshold of ten percent (for both first and second lien loans) above comparable
Treasury securities. 66 Fed. Reg. 65606, 65608-65610 (Dec. 20, 2001).
140
Federal Reserve Statistical Release H.15 Selected Interest Rates. April 21,
2003, at http://www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/H15/20030421/ (last checked August
29, 2003). The HOEPA and HOSA trigger for a first-lien mortgage is eight points
above "the yield on Treasury securities having comparable periods of maturity to the
loan maturity as of the fifteenth day of the month immediately preceding the month in
which the application for the extension of credit is received by the creditor." 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.32(a)(1)(i). Because the federal government has recently stopped issuing 30-year
Treasuries, the Federal Reserve Board staff has interpreted the Regulation Z trigger
language to mean that lenders should use the yield for 20-year constant maturities in
place of the yield for 30-year maturities. 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(a)(1)(i) Comment.
226.32(a)(1)(i)-4(iii). These yields may be determined from the Board's "Selected
Interest Rates" (statistical release H-15). Id. at Comment. 226.32(a)(1)(i)-4.
141
As the yield for 20-year constant maturities on April 15th, 2003, was 4.93%,
the precise HOEPA rate trigger for a thirty-year fixed interest loan for which the
creditor received the application on May 1, 2003 (the day the Act was signed) is
12.93%.
142
See Freddie Mac Primary Mortgage Market Survey Weekly Mortgage Market
Survey 2003 Weekly Mortgage Rates Releases (available at
http://www.freddiemac.com/learn/cgiin/dLink.cgi?jp=/PMMS/display/PMMSOutputYr.jsp&ENV=PROD). (last checked
August 29, 2003). The points and fees national average for loans during that period is
.6 percent. Id.
143
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Total Points And Fees Threshold”) (2003).
144
15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(3) (2003).
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HOSA’s points and fees threshold is uniformly lower than HOEPA’s,
but employs a sliding scale, allowing lenders to charge higher points and
fees – and avoid a loan’s High Cost designation – for loans that have
lower values. Under the Act, the points and fees trigger is met where the
borrower is charged, at loan closing: (i) for total loan amounts of
$40,000 or greater, five percent or more of the total loan amount; (ii) for
total loan amounts of $20,000 to $39,000, six percent of the total loan
amount; and (iii) for total loan amounts of $1 to $19,999, the lesser of
$1000 or six percent.145 The Act specifically excludes from the
calculation of points and fees “conventional prepayment penalty”146 and
up to two bona fide discount points, as explained in detail below.
3.
Calculation of the Total Points and Fees Trigger
The federal Truth in Lending Act specifically mandates the
disclosure of a loan’s annual percentage rate – a standardized form of
interest rate calculation – to encourage loan price transparency and
thereby provide consumers with a clearer understanding of the cost of a
loan.147 The imposition of high points and fees, which appear almost
invariably with subprime and all predatory loans, are far more confusing.
Indeed, one of the persistent abuses in the home loan market have been
lenders’ efforts to add charges to a loan that were not required by federal
law to be reflected in the loan’s APR.148 HOEPA and now HOSA
attempt to set forth a comprehensive list of charges that must be included
in calculating a loan’s points and fees and therefore possibly trigger
classification as a Covered or High Cost Home Loan. However, by
including several items in the catalogue of charges that are specifically
excluded from the HOEPA points and fees threshold calculation, HOSA
will shift a greater proportion of Home Loans into its heavily regulated
145

N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Total Points And Fees Threshold”) (2003).
For example, (and excluding up to two bona fide discount points), a $100,000 Home
Loan would be a High Cost Home Loan if its points and fees were $5,000 or more; a
$30,000 Home Loan would be a High Cost Home Loan if its points and fees were
$1,800 or more; and a $18,000 Home Loan would be a High Cost Home Loan if its
points and fees were $1,000 (that is, the lesser of $1,000 or 6% of the loan amount).
146
A “conventional prepayment penalty” is “any prepayment penalty or fee that
may be collected or charged in a home loan, and that is authorized by law other than by
this act, provided the home loan (1) does not have an annual percentage rate that
exceeds the conventional mortgage rate by more than two percentage points; and (2)
does not permit any prepayment fees or penalties that exceed two percent of the amount
prepaid.” N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Conventional Prepayment Penalty”) (2003).
147
15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (TILA’s purpose is to “assure a meaningful disclosure of
credit terms so that the consumer will be able to compare more readily the various
credit terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit”); Schnall v.
Amboy Nat. Bank, 279 F.3d 205, 219 (3rd Cir., 2002). Rossman v. Fleet Bank (R.I.)
Nat. Ass'n, 280 F.3d 384, 389 (3rd Cir. 2002); see also TRUTH IN LENDING, supra note
__ at 33 (TILA is “Congress’s effort to guarantee the accurate and meaningful
disclosure of the costs of consumer credit and thereby to enable consumers to make
informed choices in the credit marketplace.”).
148
TRUTH IN LENDING, 2002 Supplement, supra note ___ at 209.
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categories. While HOSA’s exclusion of up to two “bona fide discount
points” from the points and fees calculation appears to provide additional
flexibility for lenders, the provision will most likely never affect the
classification of High Cost Loans for reasons discussed below.149

149

See text accompanying infra notes __ to __.
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a)
Calculation of Points and Fees
Under the Act, the following charges must be included in
calculating a loan’s Total Points and Fees Trigger: (1) all items, other
than interest and a time price differential, listed in Section 1605(a)(1)-(4)
of TILA, which includes all points, origination fees, service charges and
other charges by the lender such as a loan fee, finder’s fee or
investigation or credit report fee;150 (2) all closing-related costs
specifically listed in Section 1605(e) of TILA;151 (3) all compensation
paid directly or indirectly to a mortgage broker;152 (4) the cost of all
premiums financed by the creditor, directly or indirectly, for any credit
insurance;153 (5) the maximum loan prepayment fees and penalties that
could be charged in connection with the loan and all prepayment fees or
penalties actually that are actually incurred by a borrower if the loan is
refinancing a previous loan held by the same creditor (or its affiliate).154
150

N.J.S.A 46:10B-24(3)(1) (2003). Section 1605(a) lists items that must be
included in HOEPA’s points and fees calculation. HOSA incorporates into its
definition of points and fees, the following items (excluding interest and the time price
differential):
(1) any amount payable under a point, discount, or other system or additional
charges;
(2) service or carrying charge
(3) loan fee, finders fee, or similar charge
(4) fee for an investigation or credit report.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1) (2003).
151
N.J.S.A 46:10B-24(3)(2) (2003). Under Section 1605(e), these charges are
actually excluded from HOEPA’s points and fees calculation. Section 1605(e) reads as
follows:
The following items, when charged in connection with any extension of credit
secured by an interest in real property, shall not be included in the computation of the
finance charge with respect to that transaction:
(1) Fees or premiums for title examination, title insurance, or similar purposes.
(2) Fees for preparation of loan-related documents.
(3) Escrows for future payments of taxes and insurance.
(4) Fees for notarizing deeds and other documents.
(5) Appraisal fees, including fees related to any pest infestation or flood hazard
inspections conducted prior to closing.
(6) Credit reports.
15 U.S.C. § 1605(e) (2003). HOSA treats the items listed in section 1605(e) in the
opposite manner of TILA by including them in its points and fees calculation. Section
1605(e), like section 1605(a) references “credit reports,” making HOSA redundant in
this small way.
152
N.J.S.A 46:10B-24(3)(3) (2003). This provision would force lenders to reflect
as a real cost to borrowers the indirect compensation paid to brokers by creditors that in
the form of a yield spread premium. Yield spread premiums tend to encourage brokers
to charge borrowers a higher interest rate. See text accompanying supra note __; see
also HOEPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(4)(B) (2003) (requiring that “all compensation paid
to mortgage brokers” be included in the total points and fees calculation).
153
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (2003).
154
N.J.S.A 46:10B-24(5),(6) (2003). As discussed below, unlike other state
predatory lending legislation and HOEPA itself, HOSA does not place any express
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For the purposes of the Act, “Points and Fees” do not include the
following: (1) title insurance premiums and fees;155 (2) taxes, filing fees,
and recording and other charges paid to public officials for perfecting or
satisfying a security interest; (3) certain “reasonable” fees paid to person
unaffiliated156 with either the creditor or the mortgage broker,157 for tax
payment services, flood certification, pest, flood, appraisal and
inspection fees, attorney’s or notary’s fees, escrow charges158 and fire
and flood insurance premiums, provided that such premiums are
purchased from an entity that is not affiliated with the creditor or certain
disclosures are made.159
Notably, HOSA’s definition of Points and Fees in places, is either
moot, inconsistent or confusing. First, the Act’s inclusion of financed
premium insurance is rendered moot by Section 10B-25(4)(a) of the Act,
which categorically prohibits the inclusion of any single premium credit
insurance in the first place in any Home Loan. No lender will ever
calculate the cost of such insurance because no lender will be permitted
to even charge for such a product. Perhaps the New Jersey legislature
relied too reflexively on the points and fees calculations set forth in
HOEPA, which requires that charges for single premium credit insurance
be calculated as part of the HOEPA points and fees trigger, see 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.32(b)(iv), but which does not otherwise prohibit the imposition of
such insurance charges.
Second, again by incorporating by reference portions of HOEPA,
the Act creates an apparent inconsistency as to whether title insurance
fees should be included in the Points and Fees calculation. On the one
hand, “Points and Fees” includes by reference to Section 1605(e)(1) of
TILA, “fees or premiums for title examination, title insurance, or similar
limitation on the imposition prepayment penalties on High Cost Home Loans. See text
accompanying infra notes __ to __.
155
N.J.SA. 46:10B-24(3)(“Points and Fees”). As described below, this exclusion
appears to contradict the inclusion of title insurance premiums in the points and fees
calculation required elsewhere in the Act. See N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Points
and Fees” (2)) (2003).
156
Affiliate is defined by the Act with reference to the definition set forth in 12
U.S.C. § 1841 (“any company that controls, is controlled by, or is under common
control with another company”). See N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Affiliate”)
(2003).
157
These exclusions from “Points and Fees” incorporates “the conditions” in 12
C.F.R. § 226.4(c)(7) (2003), which are actually listed in 12 C.F.R. § 226.32(b)(1)(iii)
(2003).
158
See text accompanying infra notes __ to __ regarding the Act’s ambiguous
treatment of escrows.
159
These conditions relating to premiums have been incorporated from 12 C.F.R.
§ 226.4(d)(2) (2003). N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Points and Fees”) (2003). That
regulation states that “(i) Insurance coverage may be obtained from a person of the
consumer’s choice, and this fact is disclosed. (ii) If the coverage is obtained from or
through the creditor, the premium for the initial term of insurance coverage shall be
disclosed. If the term of insurance is less than the term of the transaction, the term of
insurance shall also be disclosed.” 12 C.F.R. § 226.4(d)(2) (2003).
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purposes.”160 On the other hand, the Act expressly excludes from the
definition of “Points and Fees,” “title insurance premiums and fees,
charges and premiums paid to a person or entity holding an individual or
organization insurance producer license in the line of title insurance or
title insurance company, as defined by” New Jersey’s title insurance
licensing law.161 Perhaps the best way to harmonize this apparent
inconsistency is to read the former provision in this portion of the Act as
broader than and inclusive of the latter; that is, the former category
covers title fees paid to all parties, while the latter category covers title
fees paid only to licensed title insurers. Thus, by subtracting the smaller
from the broader category, what remains and must be included in the
definition of Points and Fees, is title fees to unlicensed title service
providers. For instance, traditional title insurance premiums, paid to a
third-party provider, would be excluded from the definition, while any
fees collected by a creditor in connection with title issues – such as some
kind of referral fee – would be included.
Finally, the Act creates some confusion about whether or in what
form escrow charges should be included in the calculation of Points and
Fees. On the one hand, the Act includes escrows for future payments of
taxes and insurance; on the other hand the same subsection of the Act
excludes bona fide and reasonable escrow charges paid to a person other
than a creditor or its affiliate or to the mortgage broker or its affiliate.
Textually, those two sections seem to mean that escrows for future
payments of taxes and insurance that are either (x) paid to the creditor,
mortgage broker or one of their affiliates or (y) that are neither bona fide
nor reasonable, are included in the definition of Points and Fees.
Although this appears to be the most coherent reading of the text,
this treatment of escrows is inconsistent with standard lending practices
in the prime market in which the retention of reasonable escrows is
common.162 It would seem more consistent with the Act’s purposes if
only those escrow charges that were in excess of reasonable escrowed
taxes and fees and insurance premiums were included within the
definition of Points and Fees. Notwithstanding this, the inclusion of a
reasonable escrow should only make up a very small portion of the
Points and Fees and so, perhaps, their inclusion may have been
purposeful.
b)

Exceptions for Bona Fide Discount Points
(“BFDP”)

In the conventional loan market, lenders frequently charge points
in exchange for a lower loan interest rate than the borrower would
160

15 U.S.C. § 1605(e)(1)
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Points and Fees”) (2003).
162
Indeed, the New Jersey Department of Banking has taken the position that
such escrows are not included within the ambit of Points and Fees: N.J. Department of
Banking and Insurance Bulletin No. 03-15 (7/25/03) at 7.
161
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otherwise receive. Discount points most benefit borrowers who can
recoup their initial point investment by paying the bargained for lower
interest rate over a long period of time. The Act recognizes the value of
such an exchange by excluding from both the Covered Home Loan
threshold or the High Cost Home Loan Points and Fees threshold, up to
two “bona fide discount points.”
According to the Act, in order for loan discount points to be
“bona fide”, they must meet two criteria: (i) the interest rate on the loan
that is being discounted, prior to the application to the discount points,
must be at most two points above the conventional mortgage rate163 for
first lien mortgages (and or at most three-and-a-half points for junior lien
mortgages); and (ii) they must be knowingly paid by the borrower for the
express purpose of, and in fact reducing, the loan’s interest rate; so that
(iii) the borrower recovers an amount equal to such loan discount points
within the first five years of the scheduled loan payments.164
Because High Cost Home Loans typically have interest rates that
far exceed two points above the conventional mortgage rate, the bona
fide discount point exclusion will have a relatively minor effect on that
category of loans. The exclusion may apply to the rare case of a loan
that is classified as High Cost solely by virtue of its high points and fees
structure, but that otherwise has an interest rate that is within two points
of the conventional mortgage rate.165 The bona fide discount point
exclusion will certainly have a greater impact on the Covered Home
Loan category, because it will certainly prevent some Home Loans from
-being classified as Covered Home Loans.
B. Prohibitions
As described, the Act provides for the greatest amount of
regulation for High Cost Home Loans based upon the valid assumption
that those loans are the most likely to invite predatory practices. The Act
also prohibits loan flipping for Covered Home Loans (and the included
163

Generally considered the average national mortgage rate, it is specifically
defined by the Act as “the most recently published annual yield on conventional
mortgages published by” the Federal Reserve Board. N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3)
(“Conventional Mortgage Rate”) (2003). For example, at around the time of the Act’s
passage, the conventional mortgage rate was 4.88%. See note __ [determining
conventional mortgage rate above]
164
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-24(3) (“Bona Fide Discount Points”) (2003). The
Act considers discount points to be recouped within the first five years if “the reduction
in the interest rate that is achieved by the payment of the loan discount points reduces
the interest charged on the scheduled payments such that the borrower's dollar amount
of savings in interest over the first five years is equal to or exceeds the dollar amount of
loan discount points paid by the borrower.” Id. Note, however, that this does not
necessarily amount to an actual savings by the borrower because it fails to account for
the time value of money.
165
It will certainly not be surprising, however, to see the subprime market
develop low interest, high fee mortgage products as they adapt to the requirements of
the Act.
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category of High Cost Home Loans), and certain additional economically
unjustifiable practices for all Home Loans.
1.
High-Cost Home Loans
While many of the following loan terms that are prohibited by the
Act may have legitimate economic justification when employed in
commercial or prime residential credit markets, the legislature appears to
have taken the position that such terms are overwhelmingly predatory in
the High Cost Home Loan market.
a)
Balloon Payments
Typically, a balloon payment appears as a very large lump-sum
payment that is due at the end of the term of a loan that has a schedule of
periodic payments.166 The Act defines a balloon payment more
expansively as any “scheduled payment that is more than twice as large
as the average of earlier scheduled payments.” 167 Lenders claim balloon
loans allow borrowers to obtain loans at lower monthly costs in
anticipation of increased income or future refinancing at lower rates.168
If the income increase does not occur and interest rates do not drop,
however, the borrower owes an enormous final payment that she often
cannot pay. In any event, the legislature seems to have taken the
position that most balloon payments for subprime borrowers are
predatory because it would be unlikely that the borrower could make the
balloon payment and may then be forced to refinance with the same
creditor on disadvantageous terms.
b)
Negative Amortization
The Act prohibits High Cost Home Loans in which “the
outstanding principal balance will increase at any time over the course of
the loan because the regular periodic payments do not cover the full
amount of interest due.”169 Such a prohibition obviously bars those loans
that are intended from the outset to be negative amortization loans. But
it also bars adjustable rate loans with capped monthly payments, even
where rising interest rates would require higher monthly payments to
ensure that the principal balance of the loan did not increase over time.
As with balloon loans, lenders claim that negative amortization loans
allow borrowers to obtain loans at lower monthly costs in anticipation of
increased income or future refinancing at lower rates.170 Again, the
166

See text accompanying infra note __.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(4)(a) (2003). This provision does not apply
“when the payment schedule is adjusted to the seasonal or irregular income of the
borrower.” Id.
168
Fannie Mae, Taking the Mystery Out of Your Mortgage: What Desktop
Underwriter Analyzes in Your Loan Application (2003) at 25.
169
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(b) (2003).
170
Fair Housing Administration, FHA Insured Loans, Calculating Graduated
Payment Mortgages, at http://www.hud.gov/offices/hsg/sfh/gpm/gpm_calc.cfm (last
checked September 2, 2003).
167
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legislature seems to have taken the position that most negative
amortization loans are predatory in the High Cost Home Loan arena.
c)
Default Interest Rates
The Act bars the inclusion of provisions in High Cost Home
Loans that allow the creditor to increase the interest rate on the loan after
a borrower’s default.171 Lenders argue that such default interest rates
encourage timely payment as the threat of higher interest rates will
encourage borrowers to make their payments. The legislature appears to
have agreed with consumer advocates who have argued that such
provisions make it impossible to cure a default once it has occurred and
thus unnecessarily increases the risk of default and, ultimately,
foreclosure.172
d)
Prepaid Finance Charges
Prepaid finance charges generally refer to “any finance charge
paid separately in cash or check before or at consummation of a
transaction, or withheld from the proceeds of the credit at any time.”173
Prepayment provisions in the prime market are commonly employed to
collect the interest due for the days from closing to the first scheduled
monthly payment, which typically would not exceed the first thirty days’
interest due on the loan.174 The Act limits prepaid interest provisions in
High Cost Home Loans by prohibiting creditors from retaining at closing
any more than two periodic payments – for example, two months’
payments on a loan that is repaid on a monthly basis -- from the
borrower’s loan proceeds.175
e)
Access to Legal Remedies
The Act voids any provision in a High Cost Home Loan that
either: (i) allows a party (such as the creditor) to require a borrower to
assert any claim or defense in a forum that is less convenient, more
costly, or more dilatory for the resolution of a dispute than the New
Jersey courts or (ii) limits in any way any claim or defense the borrower
may have.176 Moreover, a creditor making a High Cost Home Loan must
use New Jersey foreclosure procedures.177
171

N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(c) (2003). This provision does not “apply to
interest rate changes in a variable rate loan otherwise consistent with the provisions of
the loan documents, provided the change in the interest rate is not triggered by the event
of default or the acceleration of the indebtedness.” Id.
172
TRUTH IN LENDING, 2002 Supplement, supra note __ at §10.4.3.
173
12 C.F.R. § 226.2(a)(23) (2003); Regulation Z Official Staff Commentary §
226(a)(23)-2.
174
Mortgage Terms Dictionary, at http://mortgagecalculators.org/dictionary/dictionary.php3?lit=p.
175
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(d) (2003).
176
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(e) (2003).
177
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(k) (2003). It is unclear whether the legislative
intent of this section is to bar mandatory arbitration clauses. Other state predatory
lending legislation does bar such clauses, but it is not clear whether arbitration is “less
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f)
Mandatory Notice to Borrower
In addition to restrictions on creditor activities, the Act attempts
to increase consumer understanding of the lending process. The Act
requires that creditors making High Cost Home Loans provide a notice
to the borrower, at least three days prior to the loan closing,178 that,
among other things, encourages the borrower to consult an attorney and
"shop around" for the best deal on their loan.179 In addition, the notice
convenient, more costly, or more dilatory” than the court system. See, e.g., N.C. Stat. §
24-1.1(e) (2003).
178
The Act incorporates the disclosure timing requirements of HOEPA contained
in 12 C.F.R. § 226.31(c) (2003).
179
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(f) (2003). The Act requires that the text of the notice
be substantially in the following form:
NOTICE TO BORROWER
YOU SHOULD BE AWARE THAT YOU MIGHT BE ABLE TO
OBTAIN A LOAN AT A LOWER COST. YOU SHOULD SHOP
AROUND AND COMPARE LOAN RATES AND FEES.
MORTGAGE LOAN RATES AND CLOSING COSTS AND FEES
VARY BASED ON MANY FACTORS, INCLUDING YOUR
PARTICULAR CREDIT AND FINANCIAL CIRCUMSTANCES,
YOUR EMPLOYMENT HISTORY, THE LOAN-TO-VALUE
REQUESTED AND THE TYPE OF PROPERTY THAT WILL
SECURE YOUR LOAN. THE LOAN RATE AND FEES COULD
ALSO VARY BASED ON WHICH CREDITOR OR BROKER
YOU SELECT.
IF YOU ACCEPT THE TERMS OF THIS LOAN, THE CREDITOR
WILL HAVE A MORTGAGE LIEN ON YOUR HOME. YOU
COULD LOSE YOUR HOME AND ANY MONEY YOU PUT
INTO IT IF YOU DO NOT MEET YOUR PAYMENT
OBLIGATIONS UNDER THE LOAN.
YOU SHOULD CONSULT AN ATTORNEY-AT-LAW AND A
QUALIFIED INDEPENDENT CREDIT COUNSELOR OR OTHER
EXPERIENCED FINANCIAL ADVISOR REGARDING THE
RATE, FEES AND PROVISIONS OF THIS MORTGAGE LOAN
BEFORE YOU PROCEED. A LIST OF QUALIFIED
COUNSELORS IS AVAILABLE BY CONTACTING THE NEW
JERSEY DEPARTMENT OF BANKING AND INSURANCE.
YOU ARE NOT REQUIRED TO COMPLETE THIS LOAN
AGREEMENT MERELY BECAUSE YOU HAVE RECEIVED
THIS DISCLOSURE OR HAVE SIGNED A LOAN
APPLICATION.
REMEMBER, PROPERTY TAXES AND HOMEOWNER'S
INSURANCE ARE YOUR RESPONSIBILITY. NOT ALL
CREDITORS PROVIDE ESCROW SERVICES FOR THESE
PAYMENTS. YOU SHOULD ASK YOUR CREDITOR ABOUT
THESE SERVICES.
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must warn the borrower that (i) by accepting the loan, the creditor will
have a mortgage on her home and (ii) failure to make timely payments
can lead to the loss of the borrower’s home.180 HOSA’s required
disclosures are an important supplement to current federal home
mortgagor protections both because the disclosures are more
comprehensible and comprehensive than those required by TILA and
because they are coupled, unlike as in TILA, with actual prohibitions on
predatory behavior.
g)
Mandatory Loan Counseling
Recognizing that many High Cost Home Loan borrowers are
financially unsophisticated and unfamiliar with fundamental aspects of
the consumer credit market, the Act attempts to channel prospective
High Cost Home Loan borrowers who finance points and fees181 through
independent non-profit loan counselors.182 Prior to consummating the
loan, the creditor must obtain a certification that the borrower has
received such counseling (or has completed some other substantial
requirement) as to the advisability of the transaction.183 New Jersey
currently has a number of established not-for-profits, such as Citizen
Action, which provide such loan counseling.184
It is worth noting that by limiting required loan counseling to
those whose High Cost Home Loans have financed points and fees – but
not to say, High Cost Home Loans that simply have a very high APR –
the Legislature appears to offer the benefits of counseling only to those
borrowers whose loans contain costs that are less transparent to
borrowers. Other High Cost Home Loan borrowers, however, would
appear to also benefit from loan counseling, such as borrowers who are
eligible for prime loans but who are about to enter into a High Cost
Home Loan due to a lack of information about the consumer credit
market.

ALSO, YOUR PAYMENTS ON EXISTING DEBTS
CONTRIBUTE TO YOUR CREDIT RATINGS. YOU SHOULD
NOT ACCEPT ANY ADVICE TO IGNORE YOUR REGULAR
PAYMENTS TO YOUR EXISTING CREDITORS.
180

N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(f) (2003).
Note that a High Cost Home Loan can finance at most two points. N.J. STAT.
ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(l) (2003).
182
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(g) (2003). Such counseling must be given by a
“third-party nonprofit credit counselor, approved by the United States Department of
Housing and Urban Development and the Department of Banking and Insurance”
regarding the “advisability of the loan transaction . . ..” Id.
183
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(g) (2003).
184
See, e.g., Citizen Action Homepage, at http://www.njcitizenaction.org/ (last
checked August 29, 2003).
181
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h)

Direct Payment to Home Improvement
Contractors
Home improvement contractors frequently help generate
predatory loans. In many cases, an unscrupulous contractor will arrange
financing for a home improvement loan with a pre-selected predatory
lender, so as to be paid directly by the complicit lender at loan closing
before the work is complete or capably done.185 Such a direct payment
arrangement deprives a borrower of any leverage to control the quality or
timeliness of a contractor’s work. In response to this prevalent practice,
the Act prohibits any of the proceeds from a High Cost Home Loan from
being paid directly to a home improvement contractor.186
i)
Loan Modification and Deferral Fees
A creditor shall not charge a borrower any fees to modify, renew,
extend, or amend a High Cost Home Loan or to defer any payment due
under the terms of a High Cost Home Loan.187 This provision, while
facially similar to provisions limiting the costs of refinancing, appears to
address changes to the non-monetary terms of a loan as well as
unplanned contingencies that affect a borrower’s ability to make
scheduled loan payments.188
For instance, if a creditor and borrower agree to any change in
the terms of the High Cost Home Loan – as where a borrower wants to
defer a few monthly payments during a period of unemployment – the
creditor simply cannot charge any fees.189 It is unclear why the
Legislature chose to categorically prohibit charges for such
modifications – which would appear to dramatically reduce creditor
incentive to agree to loan modifications – when some could be useful to
a borrower if made available on reasonable terms.190

185

See text accompanying infra notes __ to __.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(h) (2003). The proceeds of a homeimprovement loan must be payable (i) to the borrower, (ii) jointly to the borrower and
the contractor or (iii) at the election of the borrower, to a third-party escrow agent in
accordance with a written agreement signed by the borrower, creditor and contractor
prior to disbursement. Id.
187
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(i) (2003).
188
Renewing a loan is borrowing a similar amount under the same terms as the
previous loan after its payment term has expired. Refinancing is “paying off an existing
loan with the proceeds from a new loan, usually of the same size, and using the same
property as collateral.” Investorwords.com, at
http://www.kiplinger.com/basics/glossary/#R (ast checked September 2, 2003).
Typically, borrowers refinance when they want “to reduce monthly payments or to
modify interest charges.” Id.
189
This prohibition does not prevent the creditor from capitalizing deferred
interest. Thus, if a borrower missed a payment, the creditor could add the missed
interest to the principal balance due on the loan.
190
Cf. N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(j) (2003) (limiting refinancing points and
fees for High Cost Home Loans to two percent).
186
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j)
Same-Creditor Refinancings
The Act prohibits any creditor from flipping Covered Home
Loans (which include all High Cost Home Loans) extended by that or
any other creditor in certain circumstances.191 In addition, Section 5(j)
of the Act bars a creditor from charging points and fees for a new High
Cost Home Loan that refinances an existing High Cost Home Loan
already owned by that same creditor.192 This additional prohibition
seems to acknowledge that a creditor that refinances a loan that it already
owns faces lower underwriting costs than a new creditor because it
already has at least some underwriting data on and a payment history
with that borrower.193
k)
Limited Financings of Points and Fees
Under no circumstances may a creditor finance, directly or
indirectly, points and fees for a High Cost Home Loan that are in excess
of two percent of the total loan amount.194 This section, of course, does
not bar the charging of more than two points to be paid in cash, but
recognizes that the financing of points and fees represents a hidden cost
to many subprime borrowers and frequently has the effect of stripping
equity from their homes.195 This two point cap does allow cash-poor
borrowers (e.g., those who do not have the cash to pay points and fees up
front) to access the equity in their homes, but limits those points and fees
to an amount that is more in line with those found in the prime market
than in the high end of the subprime market.196
2.
Covered Home Loans
As described, the Act’s intermediate classification of loans,
Covered Home Loans, have a lower points and fees trigger than High
Cost Home Loans and therefore includes a greater number of Home
Loans within its regulatory scope.197 Covered Home Loans (which
includes all High Cost Home Loans) have only one prohibition in
addition to those that apply to all Home Loans. This prohibition relates
to the practice of “flipping” loans.198 Flipping generally refers to the
practice of creditors repeatedly refinancing loans primarily as a way of

191

See text accompanying infra notes __ - __.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(j) (2003).
193
Where the originating creditor still holds the note, this assumption would seem
to be particularly valid as it could rely in part on its initial underwriting analysis. This
assumption might be less strong where the borrower seeks the refinancing from a
creditor who purchased the loan on the secondary market. Nonetheless, this provision
applies to the secondary market purchaser as much as it does to the originator.
194
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-26(5)(l) (2003).
195
See text accompanying note __.
196
See text accompanying note __(where they are charged, points and fees in
prime market average __%).
197
See text accompanying supra notes __ to __.
198
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(b) (2003).
192
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By
extracting prepayment penalties, points and other costs.199
prohibiting flipping in a broader segment of the residential mortgage
market, the legislature appears to have concluded that flipping is a
particularly abusive practice that inequitably strips equity from
borrowers throughout a greater portion of the subprime market than just
the High Cost Home Loan portion.
According to the Act, flipping occurs when: (i) a creditor makes a
Covered Home Loan to a borrower; (ii) that refinances any existing
home loan200 that was consummated within the prior 60 months; and (iii)
that new loan does not have a “reasonable, tangible net benefit to the
borrower.”201 The only elaboration offered by the Act to assess whether
a loan provides such a benefit is to consider “all the circumstances,
including the terms of both the new and refinanced loans, the economic
and noneconomic circumstances.”202 In response to industry concerns
about the ambiguity of the “reasonable tangible net benefit” standard, the
New Jersey Department of Banking and Insurance (“DOBI”) issued
guidelines to assist lenders and presumably, courts interpreting the
Act.203

199

See text accompanying supra notes __ to __.
The Act specifically addresses whether a loan that was closed prior to the
Act’s effective date of November 27, 2003 is deemed to be an existing home loan for
the purposes of the Act’s flipping provisions. The Act deems such a loan an “existing
home loan” so long as it meets the Act’s definition of a Home Loan. N.J. STAT. ANN.
46:10B-35(15) (2003).
201
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(b).
202
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(b) (2003).
203
According to DOBI, “lenders should look at a range of factors related to an
individual borrower’s
circumstances.” State of New Jersey Dep’t of Banking and Insurance
Bulletin No. 03-15, July 25, 2003, at 10. DOBI provides the
following examples of factors that could be relevant to the reasonable
tangible net benefit assessment:
200

•

•
•
•
•

Terms of the new and old loan, including, but not limited to,
note rate, amortization schedule, and balloon payment
provisions, provided that costs associated with (and paid at or
before closing of) the old loan, such as closing costs or points
and fees other than prepayment penalties, are not normally
relevant to the determination of flipping;
Costs of the new loan, including points and fees charged on the
new loan as well as other closing costs associated with the
transaction as routinely disclosed on the closing statement;
Loan-to-value ratio of the new loan compared to that
associated with the outstanding balance on the existing home
loan;
Debt-to-income ratio of the borrower before and after the
proposed transaction;
In cases where economic benefits do not demonstrably indicate
that a reasonable, tangible net benefit has occurred, a
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In addition, the Act specifies two additional circumstances in
which any “home loan refinancing” is presumed to constitute illegal
flipping: (1) where the primary tangible benefit to the borrower is a
lower interest rate on the “new loan” and where it will take more than
four years for the borrower to recoup her closing costs through the
interest rate savings; and (2) where the borrower will lose the benefits of
a mortgage originated, subsidized or guaranteed by or through a state,
tribal or local government, or nonprofit organization and where that
mortgage had either (i) a below-market interest rate at the time of
origination or (ii) beneficial non-standard payment terms such as
payments that vary with income or are limited to a percentage of income
or where no payments are required in certain circumstances.204
It appears from the plain language of these two additional types
of flipping that they apply even if the new loan is merely a Home Loan
and not a Covered Home Loan: in describing these additional
circumstances, it refers to a “home loan refinancing” and a “new loan”
with no mention that the new loan be a Covered Home Loan. This plain
text reading of the Act would not be controversial other than for the fact
that DOBI has taken the position that the Act only applies where the new
loan is a Covered Home Loan.205 DOBI’s analysis, however, is
inconsistent with the text of the Act. The result of the textual reading of
the Act is that all Home Loan refinancings must be reviewed to ensure
that they do not fall within this broad definition of flipping.
3.
All Home Loans206
The following are practices that are prohibited for all Home
Loans – including Covered Home Loans and High Cost Home Loans.
a)
Credit Insurance
HOSA prohibits creditors from financing any credit insurance
along with all Home Loans.207 For the reasons already described, the
packing of financed credit insurance premiums has become a huge
financial boon to certain lenders without providing any reasonable
benefit to – and, indeed, stripping substantial equity from – the

•

significant reason that explains the need for, and proposed use
of, the loan proceeds; and
Other benefits the borrower receives from the transaction.

Id. In addition, DOBI recommends that the lender “obtain an explanation from the
borrower regarding any non-economic benefits the borrower associates with the loan
transaction. Id.
204
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(b)(1)-(2) (2003).
205
Bulletin at 10.
206
This includes, as mentioned above, all Covered Home Loans and High Cost
Home Loans.
207
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(a) (2003). As previously described this
provision of the Act renders Section 24(3), requiring the inclusion of the cost of
financed credit insurance as part of the points and fees calculation. See supra note __.
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borrowers who are frequently deceived into accepting such insurance.208
The legislature apparently regarded the practice of financing credit
insurance as so valueless, that they chose to prohibit it for all categories
of Home Loans. Borrowers can still elect credit insurance in which
premiums are paid on a monthly installment basis, as long as those
premiums are not financed into the loan amount.209
b)
Encouraging Default
The Act prohibits creditors from encouraging default on existing
debt through refinancing a Home Loan.210 When a prospective creditor
encourages default, it unnecessarily puts the borrower at risk of
foreclosure and destroys her credit rating. This can easily make the
borrower utterly dependent upon such creditor even if the terms being
offered are severely disadvantageous given the borrower’s credit profile.
The legislature recognized that this practice is so universally coercive
and without legitimate economic that it banned the practice for all Home
Loans.
c)
Late Payment Fees
The Act also regulates late payment fees that creditors can charge
in relation to all Home Loans in the following ways: (i) No late payment
fee may be in excess of five percent of the amount of the payment past
due;211 (ii) late fee payments may only be assessed for a payment past
due for fifteen days or more;212 (iii) late fee payments cannot be charged
more than once for the same late payment;213 (iv) no late fee payment
may be imposed unless the creditor notifies the borrower within fortyfive days following the date the payment was due that a late payment fee
had been imposed for a particular late payment;214 (v) the creditor shall
208

See text accompanying supra notes __ to __.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(a) (2003).
210
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(c) (2003).
211
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(d)(1) (2003).
212
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(d)(2) (2003).
213
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(d)(3) (2003). If a late payment fee is deducted
from a payment made on the loan, and such deduction causes a subsequent default on a
subsequent payment, no late payment fee may be imposed for such default. If a late
payment fee has been once imposed with respect to a particular late payment, no such
fee shall be imposed with respect to any future payment that would have been timely
and sufficient, but for the previous default. Id.
For example, a borrower owes a $1000 monthly payment to a creditor due on
the first of each month. In April, the borrower pays $1000 on April 20 and misses the
assigned due date by more than 15 days. The creditor assesses a $50.00 late payment
fee for April. In May, the borrower pays $1000 on May 1st. The creditor cannot take
$50.00 from the May payment, apply it to April’s late fee, and assess another late
payment fee of $50.00 because the borrower paid only $950.00 toward May’s balance.
Instead, and in effect, the borrower cannot pay off the entire loan until that $50 is also
paid off, but otherwise the failure to pay the late payment fee will have no effect on the
borrower.
214
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(d)(4) (2003). No late payment fee may be
collected from any borrower if the borrower informs the creditor that nonpayment of an
209
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treat each and every payment as posted on the same date as it was
received by the creditor, servicer, creditor's agent, or at the address
provided to the borrower for making payments.215
d)
Discretionary Loan Acceleration
Acceleration provisions are common in loan documents to allow
a lender to demand payment of the total outstanding balance or demand
additional collateral before the end of the term of the loan, upon material
default by the borrower. HOSA bans the utterly commercially
unreasonable practice of accelerating a loan in the lender’s sole
discretion.216 The Act plainly recognizes that a borrower should be able
to rely upon a contractual payment schedule and not be subject to
foreclosure upon a lender’s whim.
e)
Payoff Letter
Where a borrower seeks information on a loan’s remaining
payoff balance, the creditor must provide it within seven business days
of the borrower’s request free of charge.217 This curbs the excessive fees
that some lenders have taken to charging for such a simple request.
4.
What HOSA Fails to Regulate
HOSA is also notable for its failure to directly regulate two very
common features of predatory loans previously described. First, HOSA,
unlike HOEPA, does not address the predatory practice of asset-based
lending by in any way requiring lenders to consider a borrowers’ ability
to repay a High Cost Home Loan.218 HOEPA currently prohibits lenders
from extending credit without regard to a borrower’s ability to repay219
but only in cases where the lender engages in a “pattern or practice” of
such activity.220 A requirement that a lender consider a borrower’s
installment is in dispute and presents proof of payment within 45 days of receipt of the
creditor's notice of the late fee. From the text, it appears that the mere assertion of a
dispute is sufficient for the borrower to avoid a late fee so long as the borrower makes
the late payment in the time proscribed by the statute.
215
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(d)(5) (2003). It appears that the creditor must
post a payment as received even if it sent to any address of the creditor, servicer or the
creditor’s agent other than the one indicated for the making of payments. This seems
odd.
216
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(e) (2003). This provision does not prohibit
acceleration of the loan in good faith due to the borrower’s failure to abide by the
material terms of the loan. Id.
217
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-25(4)(f) (2003).
218
See text accompanying infra notes __ to __ (describing lending without ability
to repay as central component of many predatory loans).
219
HOEPA defines this conduct as extending credit “based on the consumer’s
collateral without regard to the consumers’ repayment ability, including the consumers’
current and expected income, current obligations, and employment.” 15 U.S.C. §
1639(h).
220
Traditionally, the pattern or practice element of the prohibition has been a hard
one for plaintiffs to satisfy, requiring proof of several instances of prohibited conduct in
short period of time. Newton v. United Companies Financial Corp., 24 F. Supp. 2d
444, 457 (E.D. Pa. 1998). The recent amendments have loosened the requirement
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ability to repay based on her income rather than the equity in their home,
akin to provisions of a number of states addressing predatory lending,221
would have been an important supplement to HOEPA’s limited
protections for New Jersey Home Loan borrowers.
Second, the Act does not directly regulate the common predatory
practice of levying prepayment penalties on High Cost Home Loans.222
Virtually all of the states that have chosen to aggressively respond to the
problem of predatory lending have either banned or substantially limited
prepayment penalties that can be charged with High Cost Home
Loans,223 and HOEPA bans the practice under certain circumstances.224
Although High Cost Home Loan borrowers in New Jersey may have
benefited from a direct limitation on prepayment penalties, perhaps in
the form of a prohibition on such fees after a period of years from
origination had elapsed, HOSA does indirectly regulate impositions of
such penalties. If prepayment penalties are to be assessed against a High
Cost Home Loan, they cannot be imposed by a creditor refinancing a
loan already held by that creditor.225
C. Liability Under The Act
The liability provisions of the Act are somewhat complex but
allow for substantial damages against creditors who violate them.
somewhat, creating a presumptive violation where the lender has failed to document
and verify the borrower’s ability to pay. The amended rule seeks to strengthen
HOEPA's prohibition on making loans based on homeowners' equity without regard to
repayment ability. It “creates a presumption that a creditor has violated the statutory
prohibition on engaging in a pattern or practice of making HOEPA loans without regard
to repayment ability if the creditor generally does not verify and document consumers'
repayment ability.” 66 Fed. Reg. 65604, 65606 (Dec. 21, 2001).
221
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§24-1.1E (7)(c)(2) (prohibiting lending without
considering borrower’s ability to repay, but presuming such ability exists if monthly
debt-to-income ratio is 50 percent or lower); MASS. REGS CODE TIT. 209 § 32.00 (5)(a)
(same); CAL. FIN. § 4931(f)(1) (same prohibition but setting ratio at 55%); 2003 ARK.
ACTS § 2598(k)(1) (requiring lenders to evaluate borrower’s ability to repay but setting
no percentage of debt-to-income ratio that would presumptively establish such ability).
222
See text accompanying infra notes __ to __ (discussing ways in which
prepayment penalties can be abusive when made in connection with high cost loans).
223
See, e.g., 2003 ARK. ACTS (3)(m) (prohibiting financing of prepayment fees or
penalties); CAL FIN. § 4970(a)(1) (limiting or barring prepayment fees depending
proximity to closing date); 1 GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-5 (1)(A)(B) (limiting or barring
prepayment fees depending on proximity to closing date); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E
(c)(3)(a) (prohibiting all prepayment penalties).
224
Specifically, HOEPA prohibits the imposition of prepayment penalties unless
the creditor can demonstrate that: (1) the loan will not cause the borrower to pay more
than 50% of gross monthly income toward “monthly indebtedness payments”; (2) the
borrower’s income and expense are verified by a financial statement signed by the
borrower and by a credit report; (3) the creditor is not refinancing either it’s own or an
affiliate’s loan; (4) it is imposed only during the first five years of the law; (5) the
prepayment penalty is otherwise legal under state law. See 15 U.S.C.A. §
1639(c)(2)(a)-(d).
225
See text accompanying supra notes __ to __ (discussing prohibition contained
in N.J. STAT. ANN. 10B-
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Notably, New Jersey is now one of only a handful of states that has
extended liability broadly to assignees of certain Home Loans. 226
Indeed, the scope of the Act’s assignee liability provisions are broad
enough to alter the dynamic of secondary market financing of High Cost
Home Loans. As a result, the Act’s assignee liability provisions are
likely to dry up much of the funding for predatory loans in New Jersey.
1.
Creditor Liability
Section 8 of the Act provides for both damages and equitable
relief against creditors who violate the Act’s provisions. First, a
violation of the Act is deemed a per se violation of the New Jersey
Consumer Fraud Act.227 Accordingly, a borrower may elect to seek
damages under either, but not both: (i) the Consumer Fraud Act, which
mandates treble damages – itself a strong remedy – and attorneys fees,228
or: (ii) the Act, which provides for statutory damages for material
violations equal to all finance charges agreed to in the Home Loan
agreement, plus up to 10% of the amount financed.229 In addition to this
election, a borrower may be entitled to recover punitive damages for
egregious violations, costs and reasonable attorneys’ fees.230 The
structure of this damages election, which requires borrowers to choose
between the Consumer Fraud Act’s treble damages provision or the
Act’s statutory damages and then authorizes punitive damages on top of
this election, gives the Act one of the strongest consumer protection
remedies in New Jersey.
Second, the Act authorizes broad equitable relief.231 Thus,
borrowers may, in addition to seeking damages, assert violations of the
Act as a defense to a creditor’s foreclosure. Where creditors commit
material violations, borrowers may thereby be entitled to extinguish their
entire obligation under the predatory loan.232
226

See, e.g., 2003 N.M. Laws Ch. 436; 2001 N.Y. Laws 11856.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-29(8)(a) (2003).
228
N.J. STAT. ANN. 56:8-19 (in a Consumer Fraud Act action “the court shall, in
addition to any other appropriate legal or equitable relief, award threefold the damages
sustained by any person in interest. In all actions under this section, including those
brought by the Attorney General, the court shall also award reasonable attorneys' fees,
filing fees and reasonable costs of suit.”).
229
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-29(8)(a), (b)(1) (2003).
230
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-29(8)(b)(1)(b)-(c) (2003). Importantly, the Act
expressly states that its penalty provisions are cumulative, not exclusive of, other
remedies a borrower may have. N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-30 (2003). Borrowers may
therefore still assert causes of action under TILA, HOEPA, the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures, Act, common law fraud and unconscionability doctrines and the like.
231
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-29(8)(b)(2) (2003).
232
The Act also contains a catch-all and somewhat ambiguous provision that
makes it a violation of the act to, in bad faith, circumvent the application of the Act by
either (i) dividing a loan transaction into separate parts or (ii) using any other
subterfuge with the intent to evade the Act. N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-27(6)(c) (2003).
The catch-all provision appears to reflect the legislature’s concern that it has not
anticipated every possible method of engaging in abusive lending practices. Cf. Eric
227
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However, there appear to be two provisions of the Act that may
impose caps on damages that are inconsistent with this general creditor
liability provision and that are made all the more peculiar because of
their placement in unrelated sections of the Act. First, Section 6(a) of
the Act, which predominantly deals with assignee liability
considerations, imposes a damages cap of (i) the amount already paid on
the loan, (ii) remaining liability, plus (iii) costs and attorney’s fees, for
actions against manufactured home loan and home improvement loan
creditors who have worked in tandem on the borrower’s loan with the
seller of the manufactured home or home improvements (“Sales and
Services Creditors”).233 Perhaps the best way of reconciling this
apparent inconsistency is to construe the specific Section 6(a) provision
as a cap on damages only as against the narrow category Sales and
Services Creditors. Borrowers would be entitled to pursue the broader
range of damages under Section 8 against all other creditors.234
Second, Section 6(c) appears to impose a damages cap for
Covered Home Loans and High Cost Home Loans that is inconsistent
with the Act’s general liability provisions. Section 6(c) limits damages
against a Covered Home Loan or a High Cost Home Loan creditor, along
with the assignees of such a loan, to (i) a borrower’s remaining
obligation under the loan plus (ii) costs and attorney’s fees.235 While this
additionalreference to creditor liability, in a section of the Act that deals
primarily with assignee liability, may be a drafting error, the plain
language appears to impose a cap on damages against Covered Home
Loan and High Cost Home Loan creditors that is typically less than the
damages provided for in the general liability section of the Act. Perhaps
the best way to make sense at least of the High Cost Home Loan
damages cap in Section 6(c) is to read that section as a damages cap that
applies when actions are brought after the Act’s default six-year statute
of limitations period. There appears to be no comparable way to make
sense of the apparent Covered Home Loan; however, one could read the
apparently inconsistent provisions as offering borrowers a choice to sue

Posner and Richard Haynes, The Law and Economics of Consumer Finance, 4 AM.
LAW AND ECON. REV. 162 (2003) (arguing that much consumer protection legislation is
rendered ineffective by their targets’ ability to circumvent black letter prohibitions).
The provision appears to be directed against secondary market players, see, N.J. STAT.
ANN. 10B-27(6)(e) (2003), so it is likely that this provision of the Act is intended to
prevent the secondary market from structuring residential mortgage backed securities
pools so that they separate the flow of income from New Jersey Home Loans from the
potential liability that might accrue from such loans that violate the Act.
233
N.J. STAT. ANN. 10B-27(6)(a) (2003).
234
An alternative reading would authorize borrowers to choose to sue the
subcategory of Sales and Services Creditors for damages under either the Consumer
Fraud Act, Section 8(b)’s statutory damages provisions, or Section 6(a)’s recoupment
provision, whichever is the greater.
235
N.J. STAT. ANN. 10B-27(6)(c) (2003).
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under the provision that awards the greater damages or even as offering
borrowers cumulative remedies. 236
2.
Assignee Liability
The Act includes an express assignee liability provision in order
to partially abrogate the scope of the holder-in-due-course doctrine, and
thereby increase the reach of the Act’s remedies and defenses. As
previously described, the holder-in-due-course doctrine frequently
imposes a substantial impediment to borrowers who seek redress for
their predatory loans because it shields good faith purchasers and
assignees of those loans from liability for even the most outrageous
conduct by the originating creditors.237 Because many predatory lenders
depend for their financing on the securitization of their mortgage pools
and subsequent sale on the secondary markets,238 the Act’s assignee
liability provisions are meant to dry up resources available to originators
of those loans that violate the Act. The assignee liability provisions, like
the Act’s prohibitions themselves, depend upon how the loan is
classified.
a)
High Cost Home Loans
Two provisions regulate assignee liability for High Cost Home
Loans. Each of these provisions is governed by a different statute of
limitations. The first provision allows a borrower to assert any and all
affirmative claims for damages – including the damages election
described above – or defenses that she may have against the original
High Cost Home Loan creditor.239 As such, this assignee liability
provision is a complete abrogation of the holder in due course doctrine
for High Cost Home Loans. A borrower of a High Cost Home Loan can,
therefore assert any affirmative claim for damages available under
Section 8 of the Act, including damages under the Consumer Fraud Act
or statutory damages, as well as any available claims or defenses,
including strong defenses to foreclosure, equally against both the creditor
and the subsequent purchaser.
While this abrogation of the holder-in-due-course doctrine is
sweeping, the Act does provide certain safe harbors for those assignees
that did not intend to invest in High Cost Home Loans, if the purchaser
or assignee can demonstrate that, employing “reasonable due diligence,”
236

In other words, this reading might allow a borrower in certain circumstances to
sue for the Consumer Fraud Act and statutory damages election provided for in Section
8(a) and the applicable Section 6 provision. See Standard & Poor’s, Standard & Poor’s
Addresses new Jersey Predatory Lending Law, May 2, 2003, available at
www.standardandpoors.com.
237
See text accompanying supra notes __ to __.
238
See text accompanying supra notes __ to __.
239
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-27(6)(b) (2003) (purchaser or assignee of a HighCost Home Loan is “subject to all affirmative claims and any defenses with respect to
the loan that the borrower could assert against the original creditor or broker of the loan
. . ..”).

44

MODEL RESPONSE TO PREDATORY LENDING
it could not have determined that the purchased loan was a High Cost
Home Loan.”240 These safe harbors provide a variety of simple and lowcost ways for assignees and purchasers to preserve traditional holder-indue-coursedefenses for High Cost Home Loans that they inadvertently
purchase. But for those who fail to comply with the safe harbor
provisions or who intend to invest in High Cost Home Loans, the Act
does abrogate the holder-in-due-course rule and subjects them to all
claims and defenses available against creditors. In order to avoid
liability, therefore, the secondary market will either attempt to stop
purchasing High Cost Home Loans altogether by complying with the
safe harbor provision or undertake the due diligence required to purchase
only those High Cost Home Loans that do not violate any of the Act’s
provisions.
The second assignee liability provision applies even where an
assignee meets the criteria entitling it to the protections of the Act’s safe
harbor provisions, but limits potential damages. Specifically, damages
against all holders of High Cost Home Loans, even those that fall within
240

N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-27(6)(b) (2003). The Act sets forth a basis for a
purchaser or assignee to be given a presumption that it has exercised such due
diligence, if it can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that it:
(1)
has in place at the time of the purchase or assignment of the
loan, policies that expressly prohibit its purchase or
acceptance of assignment of any high-cost home loan;
(2)

requires by contract that a seller or assignor of home loans to
the purchaser or assignee represents and warrants to the
purchaser or assignee that either
(a) it will not sell or assign any high-cost home loan to the
purchaser or assignee or
(b) that the seller or assignor is a beneficiary of a
representation and warranty from a previous seller or
assignor to that effect; and

(3)
exercises reasonable due diligence at the time of purchase or assignment of
home loans or within a reasonable period of time thereafter intended by the purchaser
or assignee to prevent the purchaser or assignee from purchasing or taking assignment
of any High Cost Home Loan.
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-27(6)(b) (2003). The Act does not specifically define
“reasonable due diligence.” DOBI has taken the position that reasonable due diligence
does not typically require an assignee to review every loan being purchased. Bulletin at
8 (“The Department considered the concept of “reasonable due diligence” as generally
understood by courts, which is `what a reasonable person would have done in his
situation given the same information.’ The Department is in the process of reviewing
common banking and secondary market practices regarding due diligence review of
mortgage pools, as well as similar due diligence in the securities context, and believes,
based on the information it has obtained to date, that sampling is a standard accepted
practice.
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the assignee safe harbor provision, are limited to the borrower’s
remaining obligation under the loan plus costs and attorney’s fees.241
This second assignee liability specifically authorizes such claims
to be brought by the borrower at any time during the term of the loan.242
The Act otherwise specifies no statute of limitations for any other
provisions governing High Cost Home Loans. Accordingly, New
Jersey’s default statute of limitations period for tort actions, would
appear to apply to all other High Cost Home Loan actions brought under
other sections of the Act.243
b)
Covered Home Loans
The Act provides for assignee liability for Covered Home Loans,
but authorizes less damages than may be available against assignees of
High Cost Home Loans . Specifically, Section 6(c) provides that a
borrower suing in an individual capacity and within six years of the
loan’s closing, may assert a violation of the Act against a creditor or any
assignee of a Covered Home Loan to recover the remaining obligation
under the loan, plus costs and attorney’s fees.244 While it is important to
have provided borrowers with a strong defense to foreclosure actions
brought by assignees of Covered Home Loans, this liability is
extinguished after merely six years.
c)
Home Loans
The Act’s assignee liability provisions are more limited for Home
Loans, applying only to those made in connection with a manufactured
home or home improvement contract and offering slightly limited
damages. Accordingly, if a Home Loan “was made, arranged, or
assigned by a person selling either a manufactured home, or home
improvements to the dwelling of a borrower, or was made by or through
a creditor to whom the borrower was referred by such seller, the
borrower may assert all affirmative claims and any defenses that the
borrower may have against the seller or home-improvement contractor . .
. .”245 That is, if either a manufactured home seller or a home
improvement contractor is working in tandem with a creditor, the
borrower may assert any claims or defenses it has against the former in
an action brought against (or brought by) the ultimate holder of the
loan.246
241

N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-27(6)(c) (2003).
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-27(6)(c) (2003).
243
N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:14-2__ (2003)
244
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-27(6)(c) (2003).
245
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-27(6)(a) (2003).
246
Although the Act does not address how much involvement a home
improvement contractor or manufactured home seller must have in arranging a home
loan for N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-27(6)(a) to be apply, DOBI has taken the position that
242

The requisite level of involvement will be reached if the contractor or
seller is sufficiently involved in making or otherwise participating in
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Damages available against creditors, holders or assignees in such
cases are limited “to amounts required to reduce or extinguish the
borrower's liability under the Home Loan, plus the total amount paid by
the borrower in connection with the transaction, plus amounts required to
recover costs, including reasonable attorney's fees.”247 While on its face,
this limitation would prevent recovery under the Consumer Fraud Act’s
treble damages provision, damages in the form of the “total amount paid
by the borrower” in connection with the loan, plus reasonable attorneys
fees could otherwise be substantial.248
3.
Defenses
Creditors acting in good faith who fail to comply with the Act
may escape liability under of the Act if the creditor: (i) within forty-five
days of the loan closing, makes restitution to the borrower and
appropriately adjusts the loan; or (ii) within 90 days of the loan closing
and prior to receiving any notice from the borrower of the compliance
failure, notifies and makes restitution to the borrower and appropriately
adjusts the loan.249 The latter defense is available only where the
compliance failure was unintentional and resulted from a bona fide error,
notwithstanding the maintenance of procedures reasonably adopted to
the home loan as consistent with the substantial guidance and
precedent that underlies the FTC Holder Rule. For example, the
circumstances in which a home improvement contractor will be
determined to have “referred” a borrower to a lender under N.J. STAT.
ANN. 46:10B-27a, will include "those situations where a [home
repair] seller, in the ordinary course of business, is sending his buyers
to a particular loan outlet, or to particular outlets, for credit which is
to be used in the sellers’ establishment. In such circumstances, the
seller is effectively arranging credit for his customers.”
N.J. Department of Banking and Insurance, Bulletin No. 03-15, at 5-6 (July 25, 2003)
(internal citations omitted).
247
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-27(6)(a) (2003).
248
The statute of limitations provisions under the Act appear almost Byzantine.
They are best understood by recognizing that HOSA is enacted into the background
New Jersey statute of limitations provisions. For all tort violations that do not have an
explicit statute of limitations provision, which category includes some HOSA
violations, the New Jersey statute of limitations is six years. Cite. Therefore, unless
otherwise specified by the Act, all violations under the Act seeking the type of damages
described are subject to a six year statute of limitations. However, High Cost Home
Loan borrowers asserting causes of action and/or defenses, brought in an individual
capacity only, that seek equitable relief in the form of recoupment – an amount
“required to reduce or extinguish the borrower’s liability under the home loan” – or
similar defenses to foreclosure, can assert them at any time.
249
N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-29(8)(c) (2003). The Act preempts all municipality,
county or political subdivision ordinances, resolutions, or any other rules or regulations
related to home loan lending practices. N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-34(13) (2003). The
lending industry regarded this inclusion of this preemption clause as a significant
victory as, they argued, multiple layers of regulation adds to lenders’ compliance costs
and increases the risk of unintentional statutory violations. See, e.g., MBANJ Backs
Compromise, Origination News, April 2003.
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avoid such errors.250 This provision encourages creditors to conduct
post-closing due diligence and correct unintentional violations of the
Act.
III. EVALUATING THE ACT’S EFFECTIVENESS
Throughout the period of the Act’s consideration in the New
Jersey legislature and lingering still, are important concerns about the
Act’s effectiveness. Those concerns, which we identify and comment on
here, are first, whether the Act’s provisions will have the unintended and
harmful consequence of drying out legitimate, desired subprime credit;
and second, whether the Act’s assignee liability provisions will cause
leading bond rating agencies to refuse to rate securitized mortgages and
consequently end subprime mortgage financing by the secondary
mortgage markets in New Jersey.
A. The Continued Availability Of Subprime Credit In New Jersey
A persistent objection leveled against HOSA and other, similar
efforts to regulate high cost loans is that they are ultimately
counterproductive – that is, that such regulations will make it both so
risky and costly to make high cost loans that most subprime lenders
would abandon subprime lending entirely, leaving traditional subprime
borrowers without any access to home equity credit.251 This objection,
however, appears to be largely overstated. Based on our understanding
of the dynamics of the subprime lending market and the experience of
other states, we predict that HOSA will dry up many predatory, high cost
loans while leaving an ample supply of subprime credit available for this
still lucrative market.252 Indeed, it may be that the Act does not go far
enough: HOSA’s high cost loan triggers could have been set even lower
to bring in a greater proportion of loans into its regulatory scope without
causing material harm to legitimate subprime lending.
First, a central premise of the concern over the Act’s possible
undermining of legitimate subprime lending – that the higher costs
250

N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-29(8)(c) (2003). Examples of bona fide errors
include “clerical, calculation, computer malfunction and programming, and printing
errors. An error of legal judgment with respect to a person's obligations under this
section is not a bona fide error.” N.J. STAT. ANN. 46:10B-29(8)(c) (2003).
251
See, e.g., Kelly K. Spors, Republican Bill Aims to Mute State Laws on
Subprime Loans, WALL STREET JOURNAL, February 14, 2003, at A4 (“The subprimelending industry complains that local regulation is confusing and counterproductive.
For example, legislation enacted in Georgia makes anyone who winds up owning the
loans -- including Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac -- liable for lending violations. As a
result, Fannie and Freddie have stopped buying some loans made in Georgia. Standard
& Poor's and Moody's Investors Service have said they will no longer rate mortgagebacked securities that include loans covered by the law, and some subprime lenders say
they have pulled certain products out of the market there.”).
252
Cf. HUD-Treasury Report, supra note __ at 108 ("If the secondary market
refuses to purchase loans that carry abusive terms, or loans originated by lenders
engaging in abusive practices, the primary market may react to the resulting lack of
liquidity by ceasing to make these loans").
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associated with making subprime loans under HOSA will make their
extension unprofitable – appears flawed. As an initial matter, HOSA’s
High Cost Home Loan APR trigger – eight percent above the prevailing
Treasury rate – is still very high. Nationally, subprime loans have
interest rates that average 2.5 - 4% above prime mortgage rates.253 Thus,
HOSA’s High Cost Home Loan prohibitions will affect only a relatively
small proportion of the subprime lending market and at rates that are
already high.254
In addition, as we have highlighted elsewhere, studies of the
subprime market demonstrate a highly imperfect correlation between a
borrower’s credit risk and mortgage pricing, which would suggest a
significant range of subprime lending profitability at rates below
HOSA’s High Cost Home Loan triggers.255 Underwriting standards
among different subprime lenders vary greatly, as do underwriting
standards within a particular lending entity over time.256 In part as a
result, and very much unlike the prime market, the range of pricing of
subprime loans varies so greatly – between 3% and 19.99% in 1999
according to one study257 – that subprime lending rates cannot
consistently or accurately account for legitimate credit risk variations
and very likely reflect a strong bias toward overpricing.258
Indeed, studies by both Government Sponsored Entities and the
subprime industry itself, demonstrate that a substantial proportion of
subprime borrowers are currently highly overcharged for their
mortgages. The Chairman of Fannie Mae estimated in 2000 that
approximately fifty percent of all subprime borrowers could have
qualified for a lower cost, prime loan based on their credit risk.259 A
1996 industry sponsored poll of fifty of the then-most active subprime
lenders came to a similar conclusion.260 Accordingly, even if HOSA
eliminates a majority of high cost loans in New Jersey, legitimate
253

See text accompanying supra notes __ to __.
Studies considering the effects of HOEPA estimate that lowering the trigger
two points from ten to eight percent will cover an increase of only 5% or 3% of loans.
HUD-Treasury Report, supra note __ at 66.
255
See Baher Azmy and David J. Reiss, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle,
(unpublished manuscript on file with the authors) at __.
256
See WEICHER, supra note ___ at 34-35 (describing the substantial variety of
underwriting criteria among subprime lending entities and within individual firms over
time, which can result in large discrepancies in pricing to similarly-situated borrowers).
257
See Mansfield, supra note __ at 536. In contrast, prime loans around that
period fell into a range of under two percent. Id.
258
Mansfield, supra note __ at 540 (“it is not clear that pricing in the subprime
market has any basis at all…. Lenders will not calibrate price to risk when they can just
as easily charge whatever rate they choose.”). One study estimated that charging
interest rates higher than justified by a borrower’s credit risk costs American borrowers
$2.9 billion annually. COST OF PREDATORY LENDING, supra note __ at 9-10.
259
Freddie Mac Special Report on Automated Underwriting, September 1996, at
http://www.freddiemac.com/corporate/reports/mosely/chap5.htm.
260
Inside B&C Lending, June 10, 1996 at __
254
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subprime lenders and even prime lenders will find a large, profitable
range in which they would be willing to extend credit to traditional
subprime borrowers. Indeed, the above-analysis suggests that pricing of
subprime lending is sometimes so highly uncorrelated to credit risk and
biased upward, that HOSA APR triggers could be set even lower without
jeopardizing the provision of subprime credit in New Jersey. 261
Second, the experience of other states that have enacted similar
high cost loan regulations demonstrates that HOSA’s attempts to
diminish abusive lending practices will not also deplete legitimate
subprime lending. In 1999, North Carolina became the first state to
enact a comprehensive law to address predatory lending abuses in the
residential mortgage market.262 The North Carolina law is substantially
similar to New Jersey’s, by prohibiting loan terms and practices in
connection with high cost loans – which North Carolina defined at ten
percent higher than comparable Treasury rate and points and fees in
excess of five percent of the total loan amount.263 The North Carolina
act prohibits, among many other things, financing of any points or fees,
balloon payments, negative amortizations, loan flipping without
reasonable, tangible net benefit to the borrower, prepayment penalties,
and lending without regard to the borrower’s ability to repay.264
Recent studies undertaken to evaluate the impact of the law on
North Carolina’s residential mortgage market demonstrates that the law
operated almost exactly as intended.265 These studies concluded that
loan originations with predatory features decreased substantially in the
state after the law’s enactment,266 but did not materially decrease either
the supply of subprime credit to low income borrowers or the diversity of

261

Cf. Fed Reserve Board Commentary on Proposed Amendments to Regulation
Z, 66 Fed. Reg. 65604 (Dec. 20, 2001) (“Data submitted by a trade association
representing nondepository institution lenders suggest that there is an active market for
HOEPA loans under the current APR trigger. There is no evidence that the impact on
credit availability will be significant if the trigger is lowered”).
262
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1A
263
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1A (6)(b)
264
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 24-1.1A(7)(c)(2)
265
See ROBERTO G. QUERCIA ET AL., CENTER FOR COMMUNITY CAPITALISM,
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA AT CHAPEL HILL, THE IMPACT OF NORTH
CAROLINA’S ANTI-PREDATORY LENDING LAW: A DESCRIPTIVE ASSESSMENT, June 25,
2003; KEITH ERNST, ET AL., CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, NORTH CAROLINA’S
SUBPRIME HOME LOAN MARKET AFTER PREDATORY LENDING REFORM, August 13,
2002.
266
See QUERCIA, supra note __ at 18-20 and tbls. 11-13 (documenting North
Carolina’s comparative decrease in loans containing prepayment penalties, balloon
payments and exceedingly high loan-to-value ratios); ERNST, supra note __ at 8-9
(documenting post-enactment decrease in flipped loans without reasonable, tangible net
benefit to the borrower of 7%, decrease in “excess fees” of 25%, decrease in single
premium credit insurance of 20%, decrease in incidence of loans with prepayment
penalties of 35%, and estimating that law saved North Carolina homeowners a total of
$100 million).
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subprime mortgage products traditionally extended to them.267 The
results of the North Carolina studies suggest that subprime borrowers in
New Jersey will enjoy the predicted benefits of HOSA – a significant
decrease in the number of high cost loans with predatory terms – at the
same time the subprime lending in New Jersey will still meet the needs
of New Jersey’s low-income borrowers.
B. The Negative (Over)Reaction Of The Secondary Market To
HOSA
As previously described, lenders frequently pool together many
of their mortgages, and through structured finance transactions organized
by investment banks, securitize the mortgages and sell them to a variety
of investors on the secondary market. 268 This process of securitization
has in large part driven the dramatic rise of subprime lending in the past
decade. 269 Prior to their sale, the secondary market demands that such
transactions be rated by one or more of the major bond and securities
rating agencies – Standard & Poor’s Ratings Services (“S&P”), Fitch,
Inc. (“Fitch”) and Moody’s Investors Service, Inc. (“Moody’s”) – to
identify the level of risk associated with the pool. 270 The role of such
agencies is essential to the operation of the entire subprime mortgage
pipeline; indeed, without such a rating from at least one of these
agencies, most investors on the secondary market will not buy into a
mortgage pool.271
267

See QUERCIA, supra note ___ at 12-21 (concluding that subprime lending
market in North Carolina still large and vibrant after law’s enactment, that substantial
portion of the limited decrease in subprime lending is attributable to decrease in
predatory loans, and that subprime purchase loans actually increased after law’s
passage); ERNST, supra note __ at 3-7 (concluding that subprime market in North
Carolina still very strong after act’s passage, that proportion of subprime lending to
lowest-income borrowers actually increased, and that there has been no increase in the
pricing in subprime loans that might have been associated with a decrease in loan
availability). See also KEITH D. HARVEY AND PETER J. NEGRO, DO PREDATORY
LENDING LAWS INFLUENCE MORTGAGE LENDING? AN ANALYSIS OF THE NORTH
CAROLINA PREDATORY LENDING LAW, September 2002 (attributing limited decline of
subprime lending in North Carolina to decrease in loan application rates, not loan denial
rates); Inside B&C Lending, March 5, 2001 (reporting that North Carolina lenders
offering full range of mortgage products after law’s enactment and that there was “little
or no variation” in the pricing of those products as compared with other, neighboring
states).
268
See text accompanying infra notes __ to __.
269
See text accompanying infra notes __ to __.
270
See Standard and Poor’s, Evaluating Predatory Lending Laws: Standard and
Poor’s Explains its Approach, April 15, 2003, at: http://www.housing
choice.org/news%20stories/04152003.htm; Moody’s Investor Services, Inc., Moody’s
Reports on Impact of Predatory Lending Laws in RMBS, March 26, 2003, at
http://www.moodys.com; see also KENNETH G. LORE & CAMERON L. COWAN,
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES § 1.18
271
KENNETH G. LORE & CAMERON L. COWAN, MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES
§ 1.18; see also Jonathan Fuerbringer, Agencies to Continue to Rate Pools of New York
Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES at C4 (Mar. 1, 2003).
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Recently, after Georgia passed a predatory lending law that
contained a broad assignee liability provision applicable to those loans
designated under that statute as high cost, the major rating agencies
actually refused to rate residential mortgage-backed securities pools
containing any loans that originated in Georgia after the effective date of
the law. 272 The Georgia law authorized the borrower to assert against
the assignee of a high cost home loan any and all claims the borrower
could have asserted against a creditor but, unlike HOSA, failed to
precisely define the differences among the various categories of
regulated loans and provided no safe harbor protection for assignees who
inadvertently purchased Georgia high cost loans despite having
reasonable procedures in place to prevent such purchases. 273
The rating agencies concluded that Georgia’s assignee liability
provisions created potentially unlimited damages for purchasers of high
cost loans and were thus so risky that they could not be rated.274 The
agencies’ announcement caused turmoil among Georgia lenders and
signaled the imminent abandonment of financing for residential lending
in the state. 275 Soon after, the Georgia legislature amended the statute in
an attempt to address the rating agency concerns; specifically, the
amended law clarified the distinction between high cost and other loans
272

See Standard and Poor’s Press Release, Standard and Poor’s to Disallow
Georgia Fair Lending Act Loans, Jan. 16, 2003, available at:
http//www.mbaa.org/industry/news/03/016b.pdf; Moody’s Investor Services Press
Release, Moodys Expands Consideration of Assignee Liability for Residential
Mortgages in Securitizations, Jan. 30, 2003, available at:
http//www.mbaa.org/industry/news/03/0130a.pdf; Fitch Ratings Press Release, Fitch
Ratins Declines to Rate Georgia Loans in RMBS Pools, Considers Impact to Other
Predatory Lending Legislation; Feb. 5, 2003,
http//www.mbaa.org/industry/news/0205b.html. The credit analysis performed by the
rating agencies determine if any of the underlying loans covered by a predatory lending
statute may be included in its rating transactions and what, if any, additional credit
enhancements may be required. In performing an analysis of structured transactions
backed by residential mortgage loans, rating agencies evaluate the impact a predatory
lending law might have on the availability of funds to pay investors in the rated
securities. Id.
273
See O.C.G.A. §7-6A-1, et seq.; Standard and Poor’s, Evaluating Predatory
Lending Laws: Standard and Poor’s Explains its Approach, 03-4, April 15, 2003.
274
See Standard and Poor’s Press Release, Standard and Poor’s to Disallow
Georgia Fair Lending Act Loans, Jan. 16, 2003, available at:
http//www.mbaa.org/industry/news/03/016b.pdf; Moody’s Investor Services Press
Release, Moodys Expands Consideration of Assignee Liability for Residential
Mortgages in Securitizations, Jan. 30, 2003, available at:
http//www.mbaa.org/industry/news/03/0130a.pdf; Fitch Ratings Press Release, Fitch
Ratins Declines to Rate Georgia Loans in RMBS Pools, Considers Impact to Other
Predatory Lending Legislation; Feb. 5, 2003,
http//www.mbaa.org/industry/news/0205b.html. See also Jonathan Fuerbringer,
Lending Law in New York Gets Different Interpretations, N.Y. Times at C3 (Mar. 26,
2003).
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See Georgia Banker’s Ass’n, GAFLA: The Unintended Consequences, January
2003, available at http://www.gabankers.com/issuespredatorylending whitepaper.pdf
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and included a safe harbor provision to protect assignees that
inadvertently purchase high cost loans.276 As a result, the agencies
changed course and announced they would rate Georgia residential
mortgages.277
Similarly, after the enactment of HOSA, S&P announced that it
would not rate pools that contain certain New Jersey residential loans.
Specifically, it announced that it would not rate pools that contain the
following types of loans (“Excluded Loans”): High-Cost Home Loans;
Covered Home Loans; Home Loans made in connection with home
improvements (“Home Improvement Loans”); Home Loans made in
connection with manufactured homes (“Manufactured Housing Loans”);
and open- and closed-end cash-out refinancing or junior lien mortgage
loans.278 Purchase money mortgages, on the other hand, will be rated.279
276

Standard and Poor’s, Evaluating Predatory Lending Laws: Standard and
Poor’s Explains its Approach, 3- 4, April 15, 2003.
277
S&P announced that it would rate all pools that do not contain high cost loans.
See Standard and Poor’s, Evaluating Predatory Lending Laws: Standard and Poor’s
Explains its Approach, 3- 4, April 15, 2003. Fitch announced that it would rate all
residential mortgage pools, including those that contained high cost loans, if they also
included additional credit enhancements. See Press Release, Fitch Revises its Rating
Criteria in the Wake of Predatory Lending Legislation, May 1, 2003, available at:
www.fitchratings.com.
278
S&P has excluded cash-out refinancings and junior lien loans “because the
funds from these loans could be used for the purpose of home improvement (which
loans carry the potential for assignee liability) and this fact may not be disclosed on
origination.” Standard & Poor’s Addresses New Jersey Predatory Lending Law,
Standard & Poor’s at 3 (May 2, 2003) available at
http://www.mbaa.org/industry/reports/03/sp_0502.pdf.
DOBI has taken the position that cash-out and junior lien mortgage loans are not
subject to liability under Section 6(b) or 6(c) of the Act “unless a home improvement
contractor or manufactured home seller made the loan or was otherwise involved as
specified” in Section 6(a). DOBI, “lenders should look at a range of factors related to
an individual borrower’s circumstances.” State of New Jersey Dep’t of Banking and
Insurance Bulletin No. 03-15, July 25, 2003, at 4. DOBI argues that the scope of
Section 6(a) liability is based upon that imposed by the Federal Trade Commission’s
Holder in Due Course Rule. The FDC rule requires some degree of involvement by the
home improvement contractor or manufactured home seller to become applicable to the
transaction. Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission, Guidelines
on Trade Regulation Rule Concerning Preservation of Consumers' Claims and Defenses
11,396-11,401 (CCH Consumer Credit Guide) (1976); See 16 C.F.R. § 433.2. The
scope of Section 6 and that of the FTC rule do, indeed, overlap. And DOBI’s
interpretation of Section 6(a) is the most compelling. Nonetheless, it will be left up to
the courts to decide whether the Legislature intended that that section be interpreted
similarly to the FTC rule.
DOBI further notes that a lender will know whether a loan is a home improvement loan
or manufactured home loan because the FTC rule requires that such a loan contains a
prominent provision on the note itself that identifies it as a loan to which some assignee
liability may be attached. The provision reads as follows:
NOTICE
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S&P claims that several of the Act’s damages provisions are
unclear and, therefore may expose assignees to unlimited liability.
S&P’s position is problematic because it is motivating the lending
industry in New Jersey to lobby for a significant dilution of HOSA’s
assignee liability provisions.280 However, many of S&P’s concerns
appear overstated. For example, S&P states, without clear explanation,
that the Act creates unlimited liability for assignees of Covered Home
Loans.281 However, as previously explained, assignee liability for
Covered Home Loans is specifically limited by the Act to: (i) suits
brought in an individual capacity; (ii) within six years; and (iii) for
damages that cannot exceed the borrower’s remaining obligation under
the loan plus costs and reasonable attorneys fees.282 Moreover, S&P’s
refusal to rate Home Improvement Loans and Manufactured Housing
Loans is inconsistent with its current practice. As described, the FTC
has long ago abrogated the application of the holder-in-due course rule to
such loans and ever since S&P and other rating agencies have
continuously rated them. HOSA’s assignee liability provisions add
nothing to that which previously existed without evident concern to
S&P.
In any event, another of the rating agencies, Fitch, has concluded
that, despite some arguable ambiguities in the Act’s damages provisions,
the risks to assignees are nevertheless low enough that it will continue to
rate New Jersey mortgage pools that do not contain High Cost Home
Loans. In other words, Fitch will, unlike S&P, rate pools that contain
Home Loans, Covered Home Loans; Home Improvement Loans; and
Manufactured Housing Loans, but only so long as Fitch receives

ANY HOLDER OF THIS CONSUMER CREDIT CONTRACT IS
SUBJECT TO ALL CLAIMS AND DEFENSES WHICH THE
DEBTOR COULD ASSERT AGAINST THE SELLER OF GOODS
OR SERVICES OBTAINED PURSUANT HERETO OR WITH
THE PROCEEDS HEREOF. RECOVERY HEREUNDER BY THE
DEBTOR SHALL NOT EXCEED AMOUNTS PAID BY THE
DEBTOR HEREUNDER.
16 C.F.R. § 433.2. This requirement, of course, would not protect the assignee
who purchases from an originator who fails to comply with the FTC rule.
279
Standard & Poor’s, Standard & Poor’s Addresses New Jersey Predatory
Lending Law at 2 (May 2, 2003) available at
http://www.mbaa.org/industry/reports/03/sp_0502.pdf.
280
S&P Surprises Lenders; Decision not to rate certain pools cuts new predatory
law support, Broker, June/July 2003 at 30 (quoting statement of HOSA supporter E.
Robert Levy, executive director of the Mortgage Bankers Association of New
Jersey/League of Mortgage Lenders, that “[w]e obviously are not going to be able to
live with the bill in the present form, unless S&P changes their position).
281
Standard & Poor’s, Standard & Poor’s Addresses New Jersey Predatory
Lending Law at 2 (May 2, 2003) available at
http://www.mbaa.org/industry/reports/03/sp_0502.pdf.
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See text accompanying infra notes __ to __.
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certification by independent third parties that such pools do not contain
any High Cost Home Loans.283 Notwithstanding S&P’s position, Fitch’s
decision to rate all but High Cost Home Loans should provide sufficient
assurance for the secondary market to continue to finance such loans in
New Jersey.
It is not surprising that both Fitch and S&P have refused to rate
mortgage pools containing High Cost Home Loans. The expected
consequence of this refusal is that the secondary market will cease
almost entirely to finance and thereby will dry up the provision of High
Cost Home Loans in New Jersey. This effectively renders the assignee
liability provisions the most powerful in the entire Act. Because, as
previously described, a substantial proportion of borrowers that have
been stuck with High Cost Home Loans could have qualified for better
mortgage terms, the evaporation of High Cost Home Loans will not
significantly reduce the availability of credit for subprime borrowers.
Indeed, such borrowers will likely be offered credit at a lower cost and
with fairer terms.
CONCLUSION
In the past decade, predatory lending has become one of the most
significant threats to the realization of the American dream of home
ownership for low and moderate-income and African American persons.
Indeed, one of the primary reasons predatory lending has been so elusive
and devastating is that it has been difficult to define or regulate.
Building upon the legislative efforts of the federal government and a
small number of other states, the New Jersey Home Ownership Security
Act implements an effective, balanced response that respects the
complicated dynamic of the subprime residential mortgage market.
Despite some minor ambiguities, the Act should accomplish much of its
goal of curbing the worst abuses of predatory lending while preserving
the availability of credit to all New Jersey consumers who need it.
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Fitch Ratings, Fitch Ratings Responds to New Jersey Predatory Lending
Legislation, at 2 (June 5, 2003).
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